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ABSTRACT 
Technology is a double edged sword that presents both social opportunities and risks.  Mineral 
industries rely heavily on technology during extraction, transportation, and waste management 
activities.  Water contamination from chemical spills or byproduct leakage is a widespread concern 
because it threatens cascading environmental, financial, and health impacts to regional communities.  
Risk management is difficult because the technological, environmental, and human systems are complex 
and tightly coupled.  Uncertainty is often high due to irreducible complexity and limited predictability.   
 
These complex and uncertain risks demand a new risk paradigm that broadens the thinking towards 
“risk governance” and leverages greater public involvement.  This paper uses the International Risk 
Governance Council (IRGC) framework to conduct a retrospective multi-framework analysis on a system 
that has implemented the new paradigm to risk governance.  The Alaskan oil terminal and tanker system 
has institutionalized permanent Regional Citizens’ Advisory Councils (RCACs) to work directly with 
industry and regulatory agencies to manage oil spill risks. The retrospective analysis identifies the 
important components of the risk context, development, and design that have contributed to risk 
management improvements.  The case study concludes that a new risk paradigm that integrates greater 
public participation can reduce risk and increase resiliency in complex and uncertain environments. 
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I. Introduction 
Current mineral extraction activities involve technological and environmental risks that are inherently 
complex, uncertain, and controversial.  The rapid implementation of innovative technology further 
exacerbates the risk management challenges.  Some scholars have suggested that a new risk governance 
paradigm is needed to deal with the unique challenges presented by such situations.  Public 
participation is an integral component of the new risk governance paradigm.  However, it is unclear 
exactly how public participation should be integrated or how the new risk paradigm should be 
structured.  Even if the design were clear, others argue that a risk paradigm shift would require such 
extreme institutional changes that it is not feasible.   
This paper uses a case study approach to examine a risk system that has already shifted towards a new 
risk governance paradigm. The risk governance system surrounding the Alaskan oil terminals and tanker 
transportation has institutionalized two independent regional citizens’ advisory councils (RCACs). The 
RCACs are influential stakeholders in risk assessments, risk management decisions, and ongoing risk 
vigilance.  With their creation, the risk governance system has become a model for a new risk paradigm.  
As such, this paper conducts a retrospective multi-framework analysis of the Prince William Sound 
Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council (PWSRCAC) to draw lessons for other similar technological-
environmental risk systems.   
The following sections begin with a brief overview of the risk challenges related to mineral industries 
that involve overlapping technological and environmental systems.  It then provides an in-depth 
examination of the current risk assessment and risk management limitations which support the need for 
a new risk paradigm.  Then, the paper reviews the gradual shift towards a new risk paradigm that 
incorporates public participation.  Finally, the case study is presented.  The analysis draws on the 
International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) framework and examines the important components of 
the risk context, development, design, and outcomes.  The case study illustrates the positive outcomes 
of a more participatory governance system and identifies the critical components necessary for its 
successful implementation.  
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A. Mineral Industry Risk Challenges 
 
Mineral resource activities present both an economic opportunity and technological risk for regional 
communities (Steiner 2007).  The industry influx diversifies local economy, creates jobs, and contributes 
to both private and public revenues.  However, the sudden change in local activity is often accompanied 
by unintended consequences or negative externalities. Water contamination is a widespread concern 
associated with unknown or unanticipated chemical releases during extraction, transportation, and/or 
waste disposal.  Occurring by accidental spills or byproduct leakage, contaminated water resources 
threaten cascading health, financial, and psychological impacts to regional communities.  To ensure 
communities obtain the benefits from industry opportunities, risk management needs to adequately 
identify and reduce environmental risks (International Risk Governance Council 2005). 
Mineral industries vary by commodity (oil, natural gas, copper, etc.), location (offshore or onshore), and 
type (conventional/unconventional, low grade/high grade).  Most activities share a strong reliance on 
complex technological systems to acquire benefits and abate risk.  However, these systems create 
unique problems for the traditional risk paradigm because technological risk often involves high 
uncertainty, social discontent, elevated risk perception, and low probability, high consequence events 
(Kammen & Hassenzahl, 2001; Rasmussen, 1990).  Additional challenges emerge from innovative 
technology that expands production into new sources, such as shale and tar sand reserves. Innovative 
technologies are often utilized in new environments, both lacking the historical data necessary for 
predictive risk assessments (Aven and Renn 2009, Perrings 1989). 
Technological and resulting health and environmental risks are embedded in a larger social and political 
context that influences the related policy and management decisions (Klinke and Renn 2002). However, 
the predominant risk paradigm intentionally establishes a divide between science and society.  It 
expects that “scientific analysis of risks can control uncertainty, defeat ignorance, and provide 
indisputable input for appropriate regulation” (De Marchi 2003).  Consequently, the regulatory system 
requires that risk assessments are based primarily on scientific facts (Byrd and Cothern 2000).  Broader 
society is not often included because of perceived technological incompetence and subjective values. 
Current risk management challenges call to question the scientific authority established by the 
traditional risk paradigm.  Scientific disagreement among experts, stakeholder value conflicts, public 
distrust, and political delay tactics are prevalent (Whitfield, et al. 2009).  Conflicting positions are forced 
to argue the science instead of the embedded values and uncertainty because the current risk paradigm 
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is not structured to allow constructive deliberation among diverse perspectives (Klinke and Renn 2002). 
Stakeholder groups often produce independent risk assessments in attempts to disprove previous 
results and expose conflict of interests (Busenberg 1999b). As uncertainty increases, the deviation 
among expert opinion grows as well (Aven and Renn 2009).   
While risk assessment and management were historically conceived as separate processes, they are 
actually intertwined and partially overlapping (De Marchi 2003).  Technological risks further blur the line 
between risk assessment and management because they depend on human behavior and management 
to maintain ongoing safety.  Human and managerial error are direct sources of risk within the system 
(Merrick, et al. 2005). Reducing risk requires comprehensive and relevant risk assessments, effective 
decision-making processes, and ongoing risk vigilance. 
A new risk paradigm is necessary to unveil scientific values judgments, systematically integrate broader 
deliberation, and ensure vigilant risk management (Renn and Klinke 2004).  To do so requires a broader 
system perspective that acknowledges the surrounding governance structures that affect risk 
assessment and management decisions.  Risk governance is a concept and tool that integrates these 
traditionally separate processes while expanding to include broader social and organizational factors 
that affect the risk outcomes (International Risk Governance Council 2005).  
Risk governance recognizes that issues of governance and risk are interrelated in an inseparable system 
(De Marchi 2003). The risk governance system is complex and the interactions contribute to its ability to 
manage risk appropriately. Ignoring the interconnections or any source of information can lead to 
unintended consequences or even disasters (De Marchi 2003).  Risk governance needs to be 
systematically analyzed to gain a more comprehensive risk picture and identify appropriate 
management needs.  According to Renn (2009),  
“…risk governance is based on a normative belief that the integration of knowledge and 
values can best be accomplished by involving those actors in the decision-making 
process that are able to contribute all the respective knowledge as well as the variability 
of values necessary to make effective, efficient, fair, and morally acceptable decisions 
about risk.” 
As a tool, risk governance directs the type and source of information used in the decision making 
processes (International Risk Governance Council 2005). The economic sector, scientific community, and 
government agencies routinely contribute expert information from their respective fields (Renn and 
Schweizer 2009).  However, despite being the best representatives of social values, public stakeholders 
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have a more limited and voluntary role in risk governance.  Acknowledging the pervasiveness of values 
in complex risk management systems is a call for action for an increased involvement of public 
stakeholders. 
Through institutional and procedural changes, risk governance can promote broader integration of 
pertinent information and enhance communication among represented interests.  A shift towards a 
more participatory system with greater public access could also reframe the dichotomy between science 
and society (De Marchi 2003).  Integrating greater public participation has the potential to reduce 
systematic risk while simultaneously improving institutional trust and adhering to democratic ideals. 
However, a new risk paradigm requires a type of public participation that may need to be 
institutionalized into the governance system (Reed 2008).  It is unclear in which instances such an 
elaborate shift is most necessary, how it could develop, and what it would look like. Instead of 
postulating answers, this paper examines a system that has already shifted towards a new risk 
governance paradigm. 
B. Risk Assessment Limitations 
 
The traditional risk paradigm maintains separation between risk assessment and risk management (Wu 
and Farland 2007).  Risk assessment is focused on deriving facts that can be used to inform risk 
management decisions.  It often relies on quantitative methods and scientific experts to reduce 
uncertainty.  In contrast, risk management is focused on using information to make decisions that 
support societal values.  It relies on politicians and stakeholders to implement policies.  The separation 
between assessment and management is intended to protect scientific facts from manipulation by social 
values (Byrd and Cothern 2000).  It assumes that scientific risk assessments can be conducted without 
value judgments and that risk management can choose appropriate policies based on scientific evidence 
(Byrd and Cothern 2000).  In complex situations however, these assumptions are erroneous and cause 
significant risk management challenges (Ludwig et al. 1993).  When this occurs, the risk governance 
system can add exogenous risk into an already vulnerable system (Renn and Klinke 2004).  
Risk assessments are directed by important value judgments such as the determination of which risks to 
assess, when to initiate an assessment, what methodology to use, and how to interpret the results (Byrd 
and Cothern 2000).  These decisions require more than just scientific evidence.  They require value 
judgments that reflect the interests and concerns of society.  For example, a scientific assessment is of 
little use if it is not considered a risk problem in the first place.  Further, the results are of limited use if 
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the acceptable level of societal risk is unknown.  Regardless, these decisions have traditionally been 
disguised within scientific assessments and protected from broader deliberation (De Marchi 2003).  
These broad decisions, such as problem definition and acceptable risk, are critical value judgments that 
affect risk management decisions (Aven and Renn 2009, Byrd and Cothern 2000).  In complex systems, 
value judgments are particularly important because irreducible uncertainty is dealt with using scientific 
assumptions.  Complex systems are vulnerable to high uncertainty because multidirectional causal 
pathways, interactive effects, and delayed responses are difficult to assess.  Quantitative modeling is 
often not capable of reducing uncertainty to a necessary level to make confident and accurate risk 
predictions (Aven and Renn 2009, Ludwig, Hilborn and Water 1993).  
Value judgments are associated with the assumptions used to cope with uncertainty. However, small 
assumption differences can lead to drastically different results (Aven and Renn 2009).  Secondary 
uncertainty arises when results are highly sensitive to different assumption inputs.  It can create a 
challenge for risk management because the associated value judgments are disguised within the 
technical details of the scientific assessment.  Frequently, risk managers rely too heavily on the results 
without examining the underlying assumptions.  As a result, poor decisions are implemented and 
stakeholder conflict grows.  For these reasons, complex risks with high uncertainty require a broader 
assessment that moves beyond purely “science-based” risk assessment paradigms (Aven and Renn 
2009).  Values and uncertainty need to be unveiled to allow a more constructive and transparent 
deliberation (De Marchi 2003).     
Technological risks are susceptible to another source of uncertainty transpiring from system 
unpredictability (Aven and Renn 2009).  With prolific causal links and variable interactions, complex risk 
systems have an incalculable number of risk pathways that can potentially lead to risk events.  Many of 
these risk pathways may not be reflected in past events, but are equally likely to occur (Aven and Renn 
2009).  However, predictive risk assessments usually rely on historical and current data to determine 
risk.  Potential risk pathways that have not occurred are left out of the analysis.  The resulting predictive 
models rarely provide a comprehensive or accurate reflection of the system risk.  The reliance on 
historical evidence to predict future consequences is a critical limitation of traditional risk assessments. 
It marginalizes low probability, high risk events and underestimates accumulating effects (Aven and 
Renn 2009).  
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Aven and Renn (2009) describe low probability, but high impact events as black swan incidents.  Black 
swan events can have disastrous consequences, but are probability outliers that complicate traditional 
risk assessments.  They include oil spills, such as Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, and nuclear disasters, such as 
Chernobyl disaster.    Compared to other risks, black swans are unique because of the high public risk 
perception associated and the accumulating risk pathways that need consideration.   First, the public 
often perceives black swan events with higher risk than traditional quantitative risk assessments 
indicate (Slovic 1987).  The discrepancy between these risk perceptions indicates important social values 
that are not usually considered in the analysis.  Some characteristics valued by the public, but rarely 
included in risk assessments, include whether the risk is involuntary, delayed, unknown, uncontrollable, 
unfamiliar, potentially catastrophic, dreaded, and/or especially severe (Klinke and Renn 2002, Slovic 
1987).  Black swan events exhibit many of these risk characteristics not incorporated in the traditional 
risk assessments. 
Another concern regarding black swan events is that they can result from numerous risk pathways.   
Since complex risks have numerous interconnected causal factors, the number of risk pathways leading 
to severe consequences has the potential to be quite high (Aven and Renn 2009). For example, if there 
are one million risk pathways possible, each with a one in a million chance of occurring; then, the system 
should expect any one of them to actually occur every year. Additionally, historical data cannot predict 
all the potential risks pathways leading to a black swan event because most have not occurred in the 
past (Aven and Renn 2009, Perrings 1989). By definition, such outliers are outside regular expectations 
and patterns. 
In summary, scientific evidence and value judgments are inseparable aspects of risk assessments (Kuzma 
and Besley 2008, Byrd and Cothern 2000). While rarely acknowledged, value judgments are crucial for 
problem definition, risk interpretation, and addressing uncertainty in complex systems. The scientific 
conflicts among experts and stakeholders are often focused on methodology, related assumptions, and 
opposite values of risk ranges.  However, these conflicts are often fueled by underlying value differences 
(Byrd and Cothern 2000).  The separation between risk assessment and risk management is blurred 
when values are acknowledged throughout the entire process (Byrd and Cothern 2000).  Integration 
between these processes could lead to more informative assessments and improved risk management. 
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C. Risk Management Limitations 
 
Risk management is the process of reducing risk to a level deemed acceptable by society and to assure 
control, monitoring, and public communication (Klinke and Renn 2002).  The ultimate goal is to reduce 
the occurrence and severity of unintended consequences resulting from human activity (Aven and Renn 
2009).  Risk managers must rely on the information available from risk assessments to make decisions.  
However, traditional risk assessments do not include broader information regarding the risk 
management factors within a system that can amplify and attenuate risk.  It is assumed that once the 
proper information is provided, risk policy will be implemented, monitored, and enforced with vigilance.  
To the contrary, most environmental disasters are triggered from organizational weakness and human 
error (Merrick et al. 2005). Combating complacency and establishing risk vigilance are important aspects 
of reducing the likelihood and severity negative consequences (International Risk Governance Council 
2010). 
1. Incentives  
Despite the traditional limitations, quantitative risk assessments are useful tools that increase the 
available knowledge for risk managers. The limitations are related to the false confidence they endorse 
and the narrow perspective they use.  For the same reasons, quantitative assessments have precedent 
in regulatory policy design because they are often consistent, transferable, and defendable (Aven and 
Renn 2009).  However, government agencies cannot feasibly conduct a risk assessment and implement 
regulatory policy for every risk within complex systems.  There are too many possible risk pathways, 
changing conditions, and transaction costs.  Instead, market-based policies have been designed to 
incentivize industries to initiate private risk assessments and management strategies (Ferreira et al. 
2004).   
Private companies do not typically have an inherent incentive to prevent or limit negative 
environmental externalities because most natural resources are public goods (Costanza 1990, Ferreira et 
al. 2004). To amend this situation and ensure appropriate risk management around public resources, 
numerous policies have been designed to align private and public interests.  Some common policies 
include financial incentives, liabilities and financial assurances.   
Industry is expected to consider the potential litigation costs related to any business strategy, including 
risk negligence.  However, information and intertemporal uncertainties make it difficult to consider 
potential future costs in present accounting decisions (Costanza 1990).  Since private companies have 
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more experience and financial resources available for litigation than most potential plaintiffs, there is 
less financial risk associated with litigation (Boyde 2002). The resource discrepancy is exacerbated by the 
fact that the public has the burden of proof to show damages, which can be difficult or even impossible 
in complex systems (Costanza 1990). 
Financial assurance attempts to overcome the intertemporal and burden of proof obstacles associated 
with liabilities (Costanza 1990).  The policy forces private companies to demonstrate restoration funds 
prior to initiating certain activities that have the potential to damage public goods.  As a result, the 
burden of proof transfers onto the private company, which must demonstrate restoration before 
reacquiring the frozen financial assets.  Since potential future costs appear in present accounting, profit 
decisions are expected to promote risk reduction and safer innovations (Constanza 1990).   
In actuality, financial assurance is less effective for complex and uncertain risks because it requires 
tailored policies that adapt to changing conditions.  Design limitations include the upfront financial 
requirement, mechanisms allowed, conditions when returned, and interaction with other laws (Boyde 
2002).  Practical experiences illustrate that the financial amount required upfront is rarely sufficient to 
cover the intended costs (Boyde 2002, Shogren et al. 1993).  The established amount needs to be 
adjusted to reflect new information and annual inflations, but it is not always done (GAO 2011). In highly 
complex and uncertain environmental, policies intended to incentivize risk reductions fail to reach 
theoretical expectation because of caveats during implementation (Shogren et al. 1993). 
2. Oversight 
 
Regulatory oversight is responsible for policy implementation, ongoing monitoring, and initiating new 
risk assessments.  A broad perspective of oversight includes the government regulatory agencies, 
Congress, industry, media, and stakeholders.  The oversight design can affect technology development, 
individual and collective interests, and public trust (Kuzma et al. 2008).   In the United States, the 
enforcement and monitoring of environmental regulations is conducted primarily by the government 
regulatory agencies.  The other groups are able to contest regulatory decisions, but outcomes depend 
on the structured processes (Kuzma et al. 2008).   
To perform the oversight responsibilities, the regulatory agencies need sufficient financial and human 
resources (Hassler 2011, GAO 2010).  Underfunded agencies are restricted in the number of inspectors 
they can hire and number of inspections that can be conducted.  As enforcement decreases, the 
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likelihood of being caught noncompliant also declines.  Therefore, industry has a higher incentive to be 
noncompliant when inspection probability is low (Hassler 2011).   
In complex systems, adequate oversight also requires human expertise and advanced technology to 
provide accurate and informative information.  Private industries require the same expertise and 
technology, but often have greater financial resources to allocate to them (GAO 2010).  As such, experts 
tend to move from regulatory agencies into private industry when offered higher earnings.  Private 
industries also have an economic incentive to acquire the most updated and advanced technologies to 
assist operations. Public agencies do not.  When these resource asymmetries exist, public agencies are 
forced to rely on the information produced by private industry (GAO 2010).  Since industry studies have 
a possible conflict of interest, it erodes the oversight capabilities of the regulatory agency. 
The ‘revolving door’ concept is used to describe the movement of technical experts from public agencies 
to private industries within the same system (Meghani and Kuzma 2010).  Besides resource 
asymmetries, another concern with this movement is establishment of inappropriate relationships 
between the regulatory agencies and the associated industry (GAO 2010).  Regulatory capture can occur 
when the close relationship between an industry and it regulatory agencies creates a conflict of interest 
that deteriorates environmental monitoring and enforcement. There are many examples of regulatory 
capture contributing to risk events in the United States.  A recent example is the oil industry capture of 
the Mineral Management Services (MMS) and the resulting Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill in the Gulf of 
Mexico (GAO 2010).  
Technological risk management can be even more difficult because long time intervals between 
incidents often induce complacency (Freudenburg 1992). When risk incidents do not occur during a 
period of the time, the system is often perceived with less risk (Slovic 1987). The atrophy of vigilance 
hypothesis suggests that, “when a hazardous system operates safely, responsible organizations will 
gradually reduce safeguards” (Freudenburg 1992).  Managers may remove redundant safeguards and 
allow risky work behavior.  Government agencies may reallocate funds and personnel to programs that 
have more immediate results.  The ‘atrophy of vigilance’ is expected to reappear within a decade 
following a disaster incident (Busenberg 1999a).  The public pressure can motivate risk vigilance, but is 
less effective when risks do not materialize or are not publically disclosed.   
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3. Human Errors 
 
Risk management requires both technological and human capital to prevent and mitigate risks (Hassler 
2011, Grabowski et al. 2009, Merrick et al. 2005).  Accidents can occur when any necessary safeguard 
breaks down and initiates cascading events that result in harm (Grabowski et al. 2009).  They are a 
culmination of interconnected events that can be prevented at different points within the chain.  The 
more complex and interconnected the risk management system, the more vulnerable it is to 
organizational, managerial, and individual human error.  Even though risk management technology has 
improved, accidents still occur because human decisions affect implementation (Hassler 2011). In 
complex systems, major failures are usually traced back to human errors as the root or intermediate 
cause (Grabowski et al. 2009). For example, human errors account for at least 80% of reported oil spills, 
but are not criteria considered within traditional risk assessments (Merrick et al. 2000).   
Complex systems require coordination of simultaneous actions and decisions to maintain proper risk 
management within an organization (Merrick et al. 2005).  The organizational, managerial, and/or 
individual components influence the direct actions and decisions that initiate and amplify risk events 
within a system. Human errors imply that the necessary knowledge, skills, and or abilities to perform a 
task were either not learned or not implemented.  The worker quality, training process, safety 
promotion, open communication, feedback opportunities, and individual motivation all influence 
individual actions and decisions (Merrick et al. 2005).  
In summary, risk management is challenging because it attempts to predict and respond to 
environmental risks in the future. Traditionally, it relies on information from quantitative risk 
assessments to make decisions.  While this information is useful, it is not comprehensive because 
pertinent contributing factors related to risk management are not considered (Grabowski, et al. 2009).  
Risk management includes many risk drivers that can amplify the likelihood and severity of a risk event.  
Inadequate policy incentives, oversight capacity, and organizational systems can increase the 
vulnerability of the risk system.   
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D. A New Risk Paradigm 
A new risk paradigm recognizes the limitations of traditional risk assessment and risk management 
approaches.  To reconcile the limitations, public participation is often used to develop a broader systems 
perspective and integrate important social values (Ansell and Gash 2007). The rationale for public 
participation includes instrumental, legitimacy, and normative arguments that are summarized and 
described below.   
Public participation has many definitions, designs, and purposes that make consistent interpretation 
difficult.  For this paper, public participation is defined as “a process where individuals, groups, and 
organizations choose to take an active role in making decisions that affect them” (Reed 2008).  In this 
way, public participation is specific to the stakeholders, individuals or organizations with the direct 
possibility of benefit or harm.   
However, the literature does not always clarify how the term ‘public participation’ is used for various 
analyses.  Therefore, the following review of public participation includes arguments for the inclusion of 
stakeholders and individuals from the general public.  Individuals from the general public may not have 
a have direct possibility of harm, but nonetheless have an interest or value in a particular issue.  Klinke 
and Renn (2002) developed a risk management escalator that outlines when broader participatory 
approaches are necessary for various risk categories.  The following literature review does not 
differentiate among public participation typologies.  Instead, it identifies the main arguments in favor of 
broader public participation in a general sense.   
1. Instrumental Perspective 
 
As discussed, risk decisions require both knowledge and values to maintain relevancy and reduce 
uncertainty (Reed 2008, Renn et al. 2009). The instrumental perspective envisions public participation as 
a means to this specific end goal (Reed 2008).  Public participation is valued as an important mechanism 
that can improve risk governance by expanding the available knowledge, integrating socials values, and 
motivating risk vigilance. 
For complex issues, risk assessment and risk management can benefit from broader system 
perspectives.  Therefore, all stakeholders, including the public, are valuable because they have unique 
information to contribute. The public represents social values, but can also contribute information from 
a variety of other professional fields that can help inform ongoing decisions (De Marchi 2003).  Since 
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most professions require some degree of technical knowledge, it is erroneous and limiting to assume 
that the public is scientifically illiterate (De Marchi 2003).  Deliberation among broad areas of expertise 
can develop creative new risk management options and work towards win-win solutions (Renn and 
Schweizer 2009). Even contestation can help clarify the problem and select options that best meets 
social values and scientific knowledge (De Marchi 2003).  
The public also has local expertise regarding regional values and conditions that can be important to risk 
assessments and management.   Regional values are important during problem formulation, situations 
of irreducible uncertainty, and interpretation of acceptable risk (Byrd et al. 2000).  During problem 
formulation, public participation is useful to ensure that the risk assessment has social relevance.   
Public participation can also be used to deal with uncertainty obstacles and interpretation of acceptable 
risk (Klinke et al. 2002).  Local knowledge can be used to identify risk hazards, sources, and stressors that 
are important modeling components, but undetected by scientists.  Broader deliberation is also useful 
when uncertainty cannot be reduced because values are necessary to determine whether the residual 
uncertainty and risk is socially acceptable (Aven et al. 2009). While traditional risk assessments 
historically focus on probability and extent of damage, society is often concerned about other risk 
characteristics, such as uncertainty, ubiquity, persistency, reversibility, detection lag time, equity, 
psychological stress, and spillover effects (Klinke et al. 2002, Slovic 1987).  Public deliberation can 
address and prioritize these broader risk characteristics to determine acceptable risk. In general, public 
participation can help produce more comprehensive, relevant and higher quality information than 
would otherwise occur (Reed 2008).    
Public participation can also play an important role in maintaining risk vigilance.  Particularly in risk 
systems that involve innovative technology, public participation can provide highly responsive feedback 
that can enhance adaptive capacity (Reed 2008).  Public oversight organizations have a personal 
incentive to maintain a risk vigilant system and hold other stakeholders accountable (PWSRCAC 2011). It 
can disrupt or prevent temporally induced complacency and inappropriate relationships between 
industry and regulatory agencies from taking hold (Busenberg 1999a). 
2. Legitimacy Perspective 
 
Another reason to incorporate public participation is that it adds legitimacy to scientific risk assessments 
and risk management decisions (Renn and Schweizer 2009).  Allowing public access to the process 
P a g e  | 13 
 
 
 
creates transparency that can hold the government, industry, and scientists accountable to the public 
interest (Steiner 2007, Reed 2008).  Transparency implies that the ‘public has access to information 
about the other main stakeholders involved in risk decisions and has a clear understanding of what they 
are doing’ (Steiner 2007).  Active participation unveils value judgments throughout the process and 
forces intermediate decisions to pass public scrutiny.  As a result, the final product is more likely to have 
widespread support upon completion. 
Additionally, long-term, direct interactions among opposing positions can provide an opportunity for 
mutual learning about the problem, interests, and positions involved (Renn and Schweizer 2009).  It can 
transform adversarial relationships and increase trust among the various stakeholder groups (Rowe and 
Frewer 2000, Steiner 2007).  Public trust is necessary because widespread protests can delay projects, 
discredit scientific assessments, and devastate reputations (Wu and Farland 2007).  
3. Normative Perspective 
 
The normative rationale for public participation views the traditional risk paradigm as being 
incompatible with democratic principles of equity, fairness, and citizenship (Fiorino 1990; Kuzma and 
Besley 2008; Reed 2008).  Many perceive public participation as a democratic human right and a crucial 
component of procedural justice that helps maintain a functional democratic society (Reed 2008, Rowe 
and Frewer 2000).  The normative view accepts that the public is the best judge of their own interests 
when provided all the relevant information (Fiorino 1990).   
From an ethical standpoint, the people most at risk should have the opportunity to influence the 
management decisions that will affect them (Klinke and Renn 2002).  Public opinion and elections do not 
provide direct voice into specific risk decisions. Furthermore, the communities at risk are usually less 
organized, experienced, and funded than the opposing interests (Rich et al. 1995).  Public participation is 
a mechanism that can balance the playing field among the affected stakeholders. 
In addition, public participation opportunities can increase community capacity and civic agency (Rich et 
al. 1995).  The political process has a learning curve that can intimidate individuals from getting involved 
in the process independently.  Structured opportunities for public participation can teach the political 
process and signal that all viewpoints are useful.  It can instill confident civic agency and empower 
communities to be more actively involved in ongoing policy decisions (Rich et al. 1995). 
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4. Current Participation Approaches 
 
Public participation is already recognized as an important component of environmental decision making. 
In 1996, The National Resource Council concluded that public participation, “is critical to ensure that all 
relevant information is included, that it is synthesized in a way that addresses parties’ concerns, and 
that those who may be affected by a risk decision are sufficiently well informed and involved to 
participate meaningfully in the decision .”1 
With growing recognition, government agencies are now required to incorporate ‘public participation’ 
into environmental planning and policy processes.  For example, most environmental laws require a 
public notice and comment period (EPA 2002).  Public hearings are also a common requirement of 
certain provisions.  Some environmental laws (SDWA, CAA, RCAC, CERCLA) even have provisions that 
require more involved public participation, such as citizen advisory groups (EPA 2002). In general 
however, traditional public participation approaches are often criticized for lacking two-way interaction 
and decision-making influence (Abelson et al. 2003).   
In response, many risk managers are designing new approaches that go beyond the traditional 
participatory requirements.  Greater public involvement has become one strategy to better deal with 
complex and uncertain risks (Reed 2008).  For example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) uses 
a risk analysis framework that integrates the traditional assessment and management components 
during two critical phases of an ecological risk assessment (EPA 1998).  It focuses on deliberation during 
the initial planning phases when the problem definition and management goals are constructed and 
communication when the analysis is presented to other participants.   In similar fashion, The National 
Research Council (NRC) has recently published a new report, coined The Silver Book, to improve risk 
assessment by integrating broader perspectives during problem definition and risk acceptance phases 
(NRC 2009).  However, neither framework specifies the public participation process that should be 
implemented.  
The environmental field has been one leader in designing actual participation approaches to improve 
the management of complex systems with high uncertainty. Adaptive management and collaborative 
environmental management are widely acknowledged approaches that have been implemented for a 
variety of natural resources including water, forestry, and endangered species (Koontz 2006).  Adaptive 
                                                          
1
 NRC (1996) report does not focus on general public engagement and education, although members of the public 
who are interested and affected would be included. 
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management deals with uncertainty by creating environmental experiments that select a strategy, 
closely monitor effects, and adjust action based on monitoring results (Linkov et al. 2006).  Linkov et al.  
(2006) suggest public participation is an essential component of adaptive management because it 
enhances monitoring feedback and develops mutual trust.  
Compared to adaptive management, collaborative environmental management (CEM) is even more 
focused on public participation as an implementation strategy.  Koontz (2006) describes it as, “the 
process of engaging citizens, along with government officials and other interested stakeholders, in all 
phases of the policy process.”  One expectation of CEM is that uncertainty will be better managed by 
leveraging joint research and fact-finding among stakeholders (Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000).  
Additionally, diverse perspectives directed into constructive deliberative can create a shared vision and 
resolve conflict.   
Highly participatory efforts move towards a new risk governance paradigm, but are still the exception to 
the rule.   Linkov (2006) concludes that adoption and use of adaptive management is lagging far behind 
government recognition and recommendation.  One main reason for the limited adoption is the 
challenges associated with the evaluation of participation processes.  For example, Linkov (2006) noted 
that adaptive management is often implemented using widely different techniques.  Since concept 
implementation varies across context, government agencies and other practitioners continue to struggle 
what makes “good” participation (Santos and Chess 2003).   
There has been extensive research describing how design components, such as representation and 
interaction, affect the outcomes of public participation methods (Rowe and Frewer 2000, Reed 2008, 
Fiorino 1990). Reed (2008) recognizes that many important process components are easier to achieve 
when participation is institutionalized. Reed (2008) acknowledges the limited success of many 
participatory efforts when he says, 
 “Although participation is increasingly becoming embedded in policy, 
the requirements of participatory processes are at variance with many 
of the institutional structures of the organizations charged with 
implementing these policies.  Many of the limitation experienced in 
participatory processes have their roots in the organizational cultures of 
those who sponsor or participate in them.” 
 
Creating new governance institutions for public participation would demand significant governance 
shifts (Reed 2008).  Ansell and Gash (2007) claim that these governance shifts are usually initiated by 
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previous government failures. However, even disasters that act as focusing events cannot guarantee 
that governance shifts will occur (Kurtz 2004). Other development components are often needed.  
Institutionalizing public participation is assumed to be extremely challenging, if not altogether 
impossible (Reed 2008). 
Moreover, it is acknowledged that institutionalized public participation is not necessary for all risk 
contexts. Not all environmental risks warrant an elaborate participation process; the approach needs to 
match the situation (Abelson, et al. 2003, Rowe and Frewer 2005, Klinke and Renn 2002).  As mentioned, 
Klinke and Renn (2002) propose increasing participation as risks move from simple, to complex, 
uncertain, and/or ambiguous.  However, these three risk characteristics are often interrelated, which 
makes the participation assignment less clear than it suggests.  No scheme can directly prescribe a 
successful participation method for every context.  However, general contextual factors may indicate 
the scope of involvement required. 
Recent research has started to acknowledge the multiple frameworks that interact to affect risk 
governance success (Santos and Chess 2003, Kuzma et al. 2008, Koontz 2006).  For example, Koontz 
(2006) developed an institutional analysis and development framework to ‘illuminate government-
stakeholder relationships and the interplay of biophysical and social factors’.  The framework examines 
how government actors, governmental institutions, issue definition, resources for collaboration, and 
decision process interrelate to affect risk outcomes (Koontz 2006).  In addition, Kuzma et al. (2008) 
created an integrated approach to oversight assessment by nesting critical components into four 
broader categories, including: development, attributes, evolution, and outcome.  These approaches 
illustrate how single metrics cannot provide a comprehensive assessment.   
Complex technological and environmental risks continue to demand a new management approach that 
can systematically handle uncertainty and value conflicts (Faucheux and Froger 1995, Aven and Renn 
2009, International Risk Governance Council 2011).  Broader participation has been deemed an 
important strategy in moving towards a new risk paradigm.  However, successful risk outcomes are 
impacted by numerous interrelated variables specific to process design, development capacity, and risk 
context.  It is unclear what combinations of factors warrant elaborate integration of public participation.  
Moreover, the actual benefits from institutionalizing public participation remain ambiguous.  Without 
understanding the potential benefits, it is difficult to justify such a large governance shift. The purpose 
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of this analysis is to examine a risk governance system that has already shifted towards the new risk 
paradigm and highlight important implications for other complex and uncertain environments.  
I. Paper Purpose  
 
This paper examines a technological-environmental risk system that has already shifted towards a new 
risk governance paradigm. The risk governance system surrounding the Alaskan oil terminals and tanker 
transportation has institutionalized two independent citizen advisory councils.  The Prince William 
Regional Citizen Advisory Council (PWRCAC) and Cook Inlet Regional Citizen Advisory Council (CIRCAC) 
were established in response to the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (EVOS) to ensure adequate oversight of 
terminal and tanker activities.  The Oil Pollution Act 1990 intended for the RCACs to be a pilot program 
that would eventually extend into other crude oil terminals throughout the United States (Ginsburg, 
Sterling and Gotteherer 1993).  At present, however, citizen advisory councils with a similar model have 
not been replicated at other U.S. terminals.   
The Alaskan RCACs have a significant role within the risk governance system that goes beyond third-
party oversight. The RCACs are influential stakeholders in risk assessments, risk management decisions, 
and ongoing risk vigilance.  With the creation of the Alaskan RCACs, the risk governance system has 
become a model for a new risk paradigm. The multi-framework systematically analyzes the PWSRCAC 
risk context, development, process, and outcomes. The study acknowledges that no management 
strategy or governance arrangement will be optimal in all situations, but intends to highlight significant 
features that could be tailored to improve other risk systems.    
II.  Methodology 
A. Overview 
 
This paper uses a case study analysis approach to identify the major factors in the context, 
development, and design frameworks that have contributed to risk outcomes in the Alaskan oil terminal 
and tanker system.  Criteria from the research literature are used to guide each framework analysis.  The 
risk context and outcome frameworks are the main focus.   They use the same structured multi-criteria 
analysis to examine how risk factors have changed since the new risk governance system has been 
formed.  Since the development and design frameworks greatly influence risk outcomes, these 
frameworks are also analyzed.  However, the development and design analysis is less structured and 
criteria from the literature are only used as a guide; other important factors that emerge are also 
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identified.  Criteria are defined as the pre-established components that guide analysis.  Critical factors 
are defined as the most influential components of each framework that affect risk outcomes.   
Each framework analysis includes a detailed description and summary of critical factors that have 
affected risk outcomes. Content analysis is used to search for major themes related to the identified 
criteria and risk governance outcomes.  The critical context, development, and design factors are not 
weighted or prioritized; they are only identified.  However, the risk outcome factors are given a 
descriptive weight, including:  significant decline, decline, no change, improvement, or significant 
improvement.  The assignment of descriptive weight is based on how the PWSRCAC has specifically 
affected the risk outcomes in the governance system. 
B. Scope 
 
A case study of the marine oil transport system in Alaska is used to provide a retrospective analysis of a 
new approach to risk governance in complex and uncertain environments.  Two Regional Citizen 
Advisory Councils (RCACs) have been established to advise and supervise risk management of oil 
terminal and tanker activities in Prince William Sound and Cook Inlet, AK.  These citizen organizations 
are permanent arrangements that ensure that knowledgeable citizen voice is incorporated into risk 
governance issues related to oil terminal and tanker activities.  While the RCAC role is completely 
advisory, both RCACs have been able to leverage their financial and human resources to implement risk 
policy and ensure management vigilance (Busenberg 2007).   
Prince William Sound Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council (PWSRCAC) and Cook Inlet Regional Citizens’ 
Advisory Council (CIRCAC) are both structured by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and industry contract.  
Thus, they have virtually identical function, design, and responsibilities.  However, the current analysis 
limits the scope to the PWSRCAC because it is responsible for the area most affected by the Exxon 
Valdez Oil Spill (EVOS) and has a more prominent role in regional policy implementation (Busenberg 
2007).    
C. Sources 
 
The PWSRCAC case study was conducted using document analysis from three main sources.  First, 
government investigation reports in response to the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (EVOS) were used to describe 
the focusing event and subsequent policy changes.  Second, the PWSRCAC website provides access to all 
jurisdiction documents and publications.  These were used for all sections of the analysis, but especially 
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the design evaluation framework.  Finally, a Google Scholar search was conducted to find relevant 
academic literature related to the Alaska Regional Citizen Advisory Councils.     
Numerous sources contributed to the creation of the multi-framework analysis.  After the first Google 
Search was conducted to find case study evaluation criteria, multiple criteria categories became evident.  
Based on the general search, four criteria categories were created:  risk context, development, design, 
and outcomes.  Each of these categories appeared to be interrelated and important to outcome 
evaluation.  The multiple framework approach was later validated by other multi-criteria analyses found 
in the literature (Kuzma et al. 2008, Koontz 2006).   
D. Framework Construction 
 
While every complex risk context requires a uniquely designed management strategy, the Alaskan 
RCACs could be a useful model to be tailored for other governance systems that manage complex or 
emerging risks. This paper develops and uses a multi-framework systems analysis that examines four 
main components of the case study: context, development, design, and outcomes (Figure 1). These four 
categories were created from the evaluation criteria in the literature.  The categories align closely with 
the Integrated Oversight Assessment (IOA) developed by Kuzma et al. (2008).  
The four analysis frameworks include interrelated factors that increase and decrease the likelihood of 
successful outcomes (Figure 1). However, each asks inherently different questions: 
Context Framework:  When is the RCAC model for risk governance necessary or appropriate?  Under 
what conditions? 
 
Development Framework:  What social and political factors are needed to make the elaborate shift to a 
new risk governance paradigm feasible? 
 
Design Framework:  How should the new structure and process of the public participation institutions 
be designed?   
 
Outcome Framework:  How has the risk context changed since PWSRCAC establishment?   
 
The current analysis focuses on the risk context and outcome frameworks to highlight the conditional 
factors that warrant a new risk paradigm shift.  The development and design frameworks are 
acknowledged to be equally important and intricately interrelated. Therefore, these frameworks are 
also examined using evaluation criteria from the literature as a guide.   The development and design 
factors most important to the new risk governance outcomes are indicated with bold italics throughout 
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the final outcome analysis.  The guiding criteria for development, design, risk context, and outcome 
frameworks are discussed further in the subsequent sections and outlined in Figure 2.  The analysis of 
each framework uses the pre-established criteria and content analysis to indentify the critical factors 
that have affected risk outcomes.  Criteria are used to structure or guide analysis.  Critical factors are 
defined as the framework components that are particularly influential to risk outcomes.  They may be 
the pre-established criteria or other critical components that emerge from the analysis. 
 
 
Figure 1. Multi-Framework Analysis Diagram.  The outcomes of a new risk governance shift are influenced by the risk 
context, development capacity, and participatory design.  The criteria within each framework overlap and interrelate.  An 
adaptive framework analysis would examine how outcomes provide feedback that affects each of the other frameworks.  
However, the current analysis is only concerned with how risk context, development, and design have influenced current risk 
outcomes in the system.  Traditional influence diagram shapes are used to differentiate the contributing frameworks (ovals) 
and consequential outcomes (triangle).  Color denotes the type of analysis used for each framework.  Risk 
Context/Outcomes = Red/Light Red = Structured Multi-Criteria Analysis using the IRGC risk factors for criteria.  Development 
and Design = Blue = Guiding Criteria from the literature review. 
1. Development 
 
The development framework analysis explores the factors that made the risk governance shift feasible 
in PWS.  First, the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (EVOS) focusing event and the PWSRCAC policy creation are 
described in detail.  Guiding evaluation criteria from the literature are used to identify the most 
important contributing factors.  These evaluation criteria are only used as a guide; other important 
factors specific to the PWSRCAC case study are also identified. 
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A great deal of research has been conducted on the developmental factors that are needed to initiate 
and create a more collaborative public participation process.  Sociopolitical factors are particularly 
important determinants of whether or not a particular participation process is capable of becoming 
institutionalized.   
Lawrence (2002) examines the ‘enabling conditions’ for corporate-stakeholder engagement by analyzing 
a case study involving the corporate oil company, Royal Dutch/Shell, and two human rights 
organizations.  It concluded that the enabling factors for corporate-stakeholder engagement include 
mutual motivation, individual goals that require participation of the other party, organizational capacity 
to act, cultural affinity, recognized legitimacy, dedication to building trust and incremental gains 
(Lawrence 2002). 
Ansell (2008) suggests that prior history among stakeholders, incentives, power and resource 
imbalances, leadership, and institutional design all determine whether collaborative governance is 
successful.  Kuzma et al. (2008) recognize many important development factors such as: impetus, clarity 
of subject matter, legal grounding, public input, transparency, financial resources, and empirical basis.  
All of these factors are used as guiding criteria throughout the current development analysis. Many of 
criteria overlap with the design and context criteria, illustrating the intricate overlap and interaction 
among analysis frameworks.  Since these factors directly influence the outcomes, they are identified in 
bold italics throughout the outcome framework analysis. 
2. Design 
 
The design framework analysis explores the critical factors about the PWSRCAC structure and process 
that contribute to successful outcomes.  First, the PWSRCAC organizational structure and processes are 
described in detail.  Then, guiding evaluation criteria from the literature are used to identify the most 
important contributing factors.  These evaluation criteria are only used as a guide; other important 
factors specific to the PWSRCAC case study are also identified. 
The structural and process components that contribute to successful participation have been extensively 
studied.  Rowe and Frewer (2004) reviewed the literature and identified the evaluation criteria most 
commonly cited as important considerations.  The criteria that overlapped with the literature review 
conducted in this paper include representation, fairness, flexibility, early involvement/continuous 
involvement, transparency, resource accessibility, independence, interaction, continuity, competence, 
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and deliberation.  Reed (2008) recognizes the additional importance of highly skilled facilitation and 
institutionally embedding participation.  Many of these design criteria overlap with the development 
and context criteria, illustrating the intricate overlap and interaction among analysis frameworks.  Since 
these factors directly influence the outcomes, they are identified in bold italics throughout the outcome 
framework analysis. 
3. Risk Context and Outcomes 
 
This case study evaluates the Prince William Sound Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council (PWSRCAC) 
within the risk governance structure of the marine oil transportation system in Alaska and assesses the 
potential application of similar public participation institutions within other similar systems.  Since 
marine oil transportation has been characterized as a system with immeasurable risk pathways that 
have the potential to result in a risk event, the whole system can be characterized as a complex risk.  
Therefore, this analysis uses the risk factors identified in the International Risk Governance Council 
(2010) report, The Emergence of Risks: Contributing Factors as the analysis criteria to evaluate the risk 
context before and after the PWSRCAC creation.   
The risk context framework analysis examines the IRGC risk factors before the EVOS.  Then, the outcome 
framework analysis describes how each IRGC risk factor changed once PWSRCAC became a prominent 
stakeholder in the risk governance system.  The critical development and design factors are indicated 
with bold italics throughout the outcome framework analysis.  As such, the outcome framework analysis 
illustrates how the critical factors of each framework contributed to outcomes identified. 
The risk factors identified in the IRGC Report (2010) are not intended to be discrete units, but 
interdependent factors that can heighten the system vulnerability to risks (International Risk 
Governance Council 2010).  Collectively, these multiple risk factors make a ‘fertile ground’ from which 
risks can emerge.  Each component is necessary, but individually is insufficient to produce a risk 
outcome.  Instead, the interaction of these 12 factors in different combinations and pathways heighten 
the likelihood and severity of potential outcome.  Based on the IRGC publication, an expanded and 
explicit description for each risk factor in the context of the PWSRCAC is provided below: 
1. Scientific Unknowns: Reliable science is often in short supply when 
management decisions are necessary.  Unknowns can either be tractable or 
intractable, but both can contribute to unanticipated risks.  Evaluation centers 
on how much the PWSRCAC increases tractable unknown detection and 
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reduction while simultaneously increases system resiliency to intractable 
unknowns.  
 
2. Loss of Safety Margins: Complex, interdependent systems have tight coupling 
among components that can accelerate the spread of damage and initiate 
cascading effects.  Safety margins compare the system stress and the system 
coping capacity.  They buffer the system from potential interdependent effects.  
Decreasing the buffering capacity leaves the system more vulnerable to 
disruption and increases the likelihood of risks.  Evaluation assesses the 
influence PWSRCAC has on establishing firewalls to limit damage between 
components and build system redundancy to limit cascading effects. 
 
3. Positive Feedback: Some processes amplify or attenuate the likelihood or 
severity of risk.  They can occur through natural or social processes and can be 
beneficial or detrimental.  The current case study will consider positive 
feedback related to the system communication.  Positive feedback in this 
context is regarded as beneficial. PWSRCAC is evaluated by its ability to 
increase positive feedback within the risk governance system. 
 
4. Varying Susceptibilities to Risk:  The consequences of risky activities do not 
usually affect all populations equally.  Risk severity often differs based on 
geography, genetics, experiences, and income.  Low income populations tend 
to be more susceptible and less likely to respond to potential risks.  Evaluation 
will center on PWSRCAC’s ability to increase the response capability and 
decrease impacts on vulnerable populations. 
 
5. Conflicts about Interests, Values, and Science:  This is a broad risk factor that 
encompasses contested science and incompatible values.  In highly 
controversial situations, risk profiles are more difficult to determine because 
assessment assumptions are exposed by opposing sides to highlight biases and 
interest-driven science.  As a result, trust deteriorates among stakeholders.  
Evaluation will assess the changes in risk governance trust and consensus-
seeking deliberation among stakeholders since the inception of the PWSRCAC. 
 
6. Social Dynamics:  Also related to interdependencies in the system, social 
dynamics relate to the behavioral norms and psychology that can accentuate or 
attenuate the likelihood and severity of risks.  Evaluation focuses on how 
PWSRCAC has altered and sustained social dynamics that attenuate the 
likelihood and severity of oil spills.   
 
7. Technological Advances:  Scientific investigations and regulatory frameworks 
are not always sufficient for appropriate risk management of technology, 
especially innovative technology without historical understanding.  Regulation 
is the principle tool used to manage technological risks.  However, regulatory 
agencies often lack leadership, expertise, and resources.  Evaluation will 
determine if the PWSRCAC has increased the flexibility, innovation, and urgency 
in the regulation of technological risk. 
 
8. Temporal Conditions:  Some risks are difficult to anticipate and detect because 
of inherent or surrounding system complexity.  Warning signs that have lag 
times increase the likelihood that a risk can occur undetected.  Similarly, 
delayed response increase the severity of the risk.  PWSRCAC is evaluated 
based on its influence on the speed of system risk detection and response. 
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9. Communication:  Untimely, incomplete, or misleading communication can 
amplify risk.  In contrast open communication can build trust, gather critical 
information, and lead to between anticipation of risks.  PWSRCAC is evaluated 
based on its ability to increase the amount of two-way communication 
internally among the different risk management organizations and externally 
with the public.  For this context, this risk factor is essentially the same as 
positive feedback and will be combined. 
 
10. Information Asymmetries:  When some stakeholders hold critical information 
about a risk that is not available to others it can erode industry reputation and 
public trust.  It is also more difficult to hold responsible stakeholders 
accountable if the socially optimal risk management is unknown.  PWSRCAC is 
evaluated based on its ability to create partnerships and increase the level of 
information sharing. 
 
11. *Perverse Incentives: These are activities that either encourage risk-prone 
behavior or discourage risk prevention efforts.  Such incentives relate to any 
activity that over values short-term gain and materializes when a misalignment 
exists between incentives industry faces and the amount of risk society desires.  
PWSRCAC mainly influences this risk factor by encouraging risk prevention 
efforts. 
 
12. *Malicious Motives and Acts:  These risk factors are most influential in widely 
distributed and interconnected systems, such as transportation networks.  It 
includes deliberate attacks from terrorists, warring states, or other groups.  
While the Alaskan oil industry involves a widespread transportation system, 
this risk factor was not evaluated in this case study to limit scope to non-
terrorist induced risks. 
 
*Not evaluated in this case study (See reasons below) 
 
The IRGC report acknowledges that not all of the contributing risk factors will be pertinent to every risk 
context (International Risk Governance Council 2010).  In this study, to reduce scope, perverse 
incentives and malicious motives and acts are not considered.  The perverse incentives risk factor is 
applicable to risk governance issues highlighted after the EVOS, but was specifically countered by 
increased liability and the industry trust fund established in OPA 90, not necessarily through PWSRCAC.  
PWSRCAC may alter the market incentives, but it likely does it indirectly through alterations to other risk 
factors being evaluated.  Malicious motives and acts are not considered an important risk factor within 
the Alaskan marine oil transport system because attacks have not occurred in the past.  Since positive 
feedback and communication are combined, only nine IRGC risk factors are used in the retrospective 
analysis of the Alaskan RCAC to evaluate context and outcomes on the risk governance system. Figure 2 
summarizes the framework and the guiding criteria used in this paper. 
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Framework Guiding Questions Guiding Criteria 
Risk Context 
When is the RCAC model for risk 
governance necessary or 
appropriate?  Under what 
conditions? 
Scientific Unknowns, Loss of Safety Margins, Positive 
Feedback/Communication, Varying Susceptibilities to 
Risk, Conflicts about Interests/Values/Science, Social 
Dynamics, Technological Advances, Temporal 
Conditions, Information Asymmetries (IRGC 2010) 
Development 
What social and political factors 
are needed to make the elaborate 
shift to a new risk governance 
paradigm feasible? 
Mutual Motivation, Dependency, Organizational 
Capacity, Cultural Affinity, Recognized Legitimacy, 
Dedicated to Trust Building and Incremental Gains 
(Lawerence 2002); Ansell (2008) Prior Stakeholder 
History, Incentives, Power and Resource Imbalances, 
Leadership, and Institutional design (Ansell 2008); 
Impetus, Clarity of Subject Matter, Legal Grounding, 
Public Input, Transparency, Transparency, Financial 
Resources, Empirical Basis (Kuzma 2008)   
Design 
How should the new public 
participation institutions be 
designed (process, structure, 
resources)?   
Representation, Fairness, Flexibility, Early 
Involvement/Continuous Involvement, Transparency, 
Resource Accessibility, Independence, Interaction, 
Continuity, Competence, and Deliberation (Rowe and 
Frewer 2004); Participatory Philosophy, 
Early/Continuous Involvement, Representation, Clear 
Objectives, Tailored Methods, Facilitation, Integrated 
Scientific and Local Knowledge, Institutionalized (Reed 
2008) 
Outcomes 
How has the risk context changed 
since PWSRCAC establishment? 
Scientific Unknowns, Loss of Safety Margins, Positive 
Feedback/Communication, Varying Susceptibilities to 
Risk, Conflicts about Interests/Values/Science, Social 
Dynamics, Technological Advances, Temporal 
Conditions, Information Asymmetries (IRGC 2010) 
Figure 2. Multi-Framework Analysis Guiding Questions and Criteria Chart 
III. Multi- Framework Analysis 
The Alaskan oil transportation system is used as a case study to examine the three broad barriers of 
successful implementation of more participatory risk governance systems.  A retrospective multi-
framework analysis of a risk governance system already established is used to identify the potential 
outcomes and the contributing critical components.  First, a descriptive analysis is conducted on the 
EVOS and PWSRCAC policy creation.  Second, a descriptive analysis is conducted on the PWSRCAC 
organizational structure and processes. Finally, the IRGC (2010) risk factors are used in a structured 
analysis of the risk context and outcomes.  Critical factors of each framework are identified after each 
step.   The critical development and design factors are identified in bold italics throughout the outcome 
framework analysis to illustrate how those factors influence the outcomes and ultimately success. 
A. Development Framework 
 
The EVOS impetus and PWSRCAC creation is described in the following two sections.  The critical 
development factors that emerge from both sections are identified and discussed afterwards.  The
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 evaluation criteria from the literature are used as a guide, but other important development factors 
influencing the PWSRCAC outcomes are identified. The critical factors are identified in bold italics 
throughout the outcome framework analysis. 
1. Descriptive Analysis 
Impetus: Exxon Valdez Oil Spill 
 
On March 24th, 1989 a major oil spill in Alaska illustrated many risk governance failures related to risk 
prevention and response when the Exxon Valdez supertanker accidentally ran aground on Bligh Reef in 
Prince William Sound, AK (Figure 3). The captain had notified the U.S. Coast Guard Vessel Traffic Service 
(VTS) that the tanker was moving into the incoming traffic lane to avoid icebergs from the Columbia 
Glacier (The National Response Team 1989).  However, the tanker was directed too far off course and 
eventually ran aground Bligh Reef in only 30 feet of water. By the time the response team arrived, 10 
million gallons of oil had already escaped across the remote and sensitive landscape (The National 
Response Team 1989).   
 
 
Figure 3. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Map (EVOSTC 2012) 
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The subsequent response, coordinated by various federal, state, and industry organizations, was 
inadequate and only intensified the severity of the spill.  The response was characterized by 
uncoordinated mitigation efforts, insufficient equipment, and delays (The National Response Team 
1989).  As illustrated in Figure 4, management decisions were complex and required knowledge that was 
not available or adequately coordinated among stakeholders (Harrald et al. 1990). For example, 
organizations involved had different oil spill contingency plans and none were prepared for large-scale 
implementation. The opportunity to burn surface oil passed as agencies struggled to reach protocol 
consensus (The National Response Team 1989). Over 14,000 vessels and 85 helicopters operated by 
various agencies and stakeholders were dispatched without any response training (The National 
Response Team 1989).   
Technology used in the response included chemical dispersants, burning, biomediation, oil containment 
booms, oil skimmers, and pressure washes (National Parks Service 2009). However, these approaches 
were largely ineffective.  Initial vessel response was delayed 10 hours because the emergency barge at 
the terminal was not ready for deployment (The National Response Team 1989).  Additionally, local 
equipment supply was both insufficient and unexpectedly damaged.  The one oil skimmer was only able 
to recover 32 barrels of oil before debris obstructions resulted in equipment failure (Alaska Sea Grant 
1990).   
The remote location of the spill and harsh weather exacerbated the technological inefficiencies (The 
National Response Team 1989).    Containment equipment needed to travel long distances across often 
rough waters and radio communication suffered from intermittent connections because of the 
mountainous landscape.  In the end, only about 10% of the crude oil was recovered from the spill (The 
National Response Team 1989). 
At the time, the Exxon Valdez disaster was the largest and most expensive oil spill in North America.  It 
established a new precedent to the magnitude of potential risks associated with marine oil trade.  Exxon 
Mobile suffered a large financial loss to pay for damages (Costanza 2010). However, the community 
residents who were affected had the burden of proof of showing damages before receiving appropriate 
financial compensation.  Most civil compensation was not awarded until nearly two decades after the 
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accident.  Besides financial losses, the full costs of the accident also included environmental, health, and 
economic consequences that could not be directly recovered (Figure 5).  
 
Figure 4. Influence Diagram of EVOS Response.  Decisions are represented by rectangles and uncertain information is 
represented by ovals. (Harrald et. al 1990 
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Figure 5. Costs of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill 
 
The environmental impacts spread across 1,300 miles of shoreline and impacted numerous wildlife 
species (National Parks Service 2009). The oil affected nine species of marine mammals, 71 species of 
seabirds, large invertebrate populations, and fisheries (National Parks Service 2009).  Acute mortality 
affected at least 20 seals, 20 sea lions, over 1,000 sea otters, and up to 270,000 seabirds (Alaska Sea 
Grant 1990).  An additional 22 killer whales disappeared in the following year (National Parks Service 
2009).   
The Alaskan commercial fishing industries included herring, salmon, pot shrimp, black cod, bottom fish, 
crab, and smelt (Alaska Sea Grant 1990).  The timing of the spill coincided with the spring herring 
spawning.  A temporary moratorium on some fisheries was initiated to protect future harvests and 
consumers from contamination risks. Nonetheless, the salmon fishery declined in 1990 and herring 
fishery collapsed in 1993 (Alaska Sea Grant 1990).   The moratorium and lower harvests put economic 
strains on thousands of fisherman and the processing industry (The National Response Team 1989).   
In addition, communities struggled to cope with numerous rising health ailments. Many commercial 
fishermen with privately owned boats were hired to assist with the clean-up. These workers had 
exposure to volatile components of crude oil and chemical dispersants (The National Response Team 
1989).  Other community health ailments included general anxiety, post-traumatic stress syndrome, and 
Category Damage 
Exxon Mobile Financial 
$150 million Criminal Plea Agreement, $100 million Criminal Restitution, $900 
million Civil Settlement, $500 million punitive damages 
Environmental 
Nine marine mammal species(mortality = 20 seals, 20 sea lions, 1000+ sea otters, 
25 grey whales*, 22 killer whales*), 71 species of seabirds (mortality = 270,000), 
decreased invertebrate populations, fish kills 
Human Health 
Native lifestyle disruption, worker hazards, depression, post-traumatic stress 
disorder, depression, alcohol/drug abuse, divorce 
Economic 
Fishery moratoriums, salmon fishery declines, herring fishery collapse, decreased 
tourism, decrease recreation 
Other Two decades of legal battles 
*unconfirmed 
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depression (Alaska Sea Grant 1990).  Increased divorce rates and alcohol and drug use split up 
communities.  Native communities were especially vulnerable to disrupting activity and warnings of 
seafood contamination (Alaska Sea Grant 1990).  
The immediate oil spill causes involved a navigational error, possible captain intoxication, and crew 
fatigue (Alaska Sea Grant 1990).  However, the investigation confirmed that the root causes were more 
systemic (Alaska Sea Grant 1990).   The exact series of events that lead to the oil spill could not have 
been predicted.  However, the management strategies failed to detect and firewall the chain of events 
that lead to the spill. The institutional arrangements that managed the technological risks had allowed a 
negligent atmosphere in which appropriate prevention and response safeguards were not in place. 
Complacency resulted from a lack of serious spills for several years, oil industry public relations, Coast 
Guard budget limitations, and regulatory capture evident by the interpersonal relationships among 
industry and government enforcement officials (Alaska Sea Grant 1989).  
After the EVOS, the federal Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) and additional state legislation mandated 
more stringent safety firewalls.  Some examples include the phase-in of double hulled oil tankers, 
deployment of vessel tracking systems with a larger range, more available response equipment, alcohol 
testing, and fewer worker hours (PWSRCAC 2009).  They also established stricter liability provisions for 
an oil spill, a federal oil spill liability trust fund, and extensive institutional changes for risk management 
of terminal and tanker activities in Alaska (PWSRCAC 2009).  
The state of Alaska established two new organizations in the risk governance system.  The Exxon Valdez 
Oil Spill Trustee Council (EVOSTC) was created to oversee use of civil settlement funds with state and 
federal oversight.  Also, the Prince William Sound Science Center was created to provide environmental 
monitoring and research. 
Federal legislation established an additional three organizations in the system. The Prince William Sound 
Oil Spill Recovery Institute (OSRI) was created and funded from the federal trust to support research and 
development projects.  In addition, Regional Citizens’ Advisory Councils (RCACs) were mandated for 
Prince William Sound and Cook Inlet to provide direct stakeholder advice into marine oil transport 
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management. More stakeholder involvement was believed to combat the complacency that was 
perceived to be a major contributing factor to the Exxon Valdez accident.  
The EVOS illuminated the high uncertainty surrounding the overlapping technological and 
environmental risks.  The risk governance system had been unresponsive to warning signs and ignorant 
about the likelihood and severity of potential oil spills.  Even though the risk was high, there was little 
incentive for industry or government agencies to perform additional risk assessments or implement new 
safeguards.  Without actual damage, the main risk governance stakeholders were complacent.  
However, EVOS unveiled the risk and ignorance present in the system and triggered a highly reactive 
governance system.  It primed the system for restructuring.
Creation 
 
The public had attempted to create a Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council (RCAC) prior to EVOS because 
they were concerned about the oil industry activities and regulatory oversight (PWSRCAC 2000, 
Ginsburg et al. 1993).  The concept originated from an effective citizen council that manages the North 
Sea marine oil terminal in Sullom Voe, Scotland (Ginsburg et al. 1993, Steiner 2007).  However, when the 
public group presented the concept to the Alyeska Pipeline Company, the oil industry had no political 
pressure to make such changes and declined the offer (Ginsburg et al. 1993).  The concept eventually 
appeared in the Alaskan state legislature, but failed to pass amidst heavy lobbying by the oil industry 
(Steiner 2008). 
The focusing event of the EVOS significantly changed the sociopolitical environment and primed the risk 
governance system for restructuring (Kurtz 2004). Escalating public suspicion, industry management 
changes, and political shifts helped create a new opportunity for RCAC development.  In 1989, leaders 
from a highly motivated group of commercial fisherman in the city of Cordova invited the Alyeska 
Pipeline Company into a meeting to discuss the possibility of the PWSRCAC (Ginsburg et al. 1993).  The 
Cordova group had previous experience organizing against the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, super tanker 
traffic, and periodic lawsuits (Alaska Sea Grant 1989). In the wake of the EVOS, Alyeska viewed a 
Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council as a mutual gains opportunity and accepted the invitation to 
negotiate (Ginsburg et al. 1993).   
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While Exxon Mobile was the only liable party, public backlash indiscriminately fell upon the entire 
industry.  Since the Alyeska Pipeline Company is responsible for the oil industry pipeline and terminal, 
the company incurred a large amount of political criticism.  The company strategized that a permanent 
partnership with a citizen group could improve public understanding of company prevention and 
response capabilities (Ginsburg et al. 1993).  Additionally, the citizens had exhibited valuable local 
knowledge about the region and conditions during the response.  The company wanted to incorporate 
this knowledge into the contingency plan improvements.   
Stakeholders became more demanding having felt vindicated by the Exxon Valdez oil spill. The 
represented stakeholders were highly motivated to improve the risk management in order to protect 
their livelihoods (Ginsburg et al. 1993).  While the region received an economic boost from oil industry 
activities, impacted stakeholders did not consider the management of the potential technological risks 
sufficient (Ginsburg et al. 1993). The potential risks disrupted the other important industries in the 
region, including commercial fishery and tourism.   
In 1990, after six months of negotiations, the citizen group and the Alyeska Pipeline Company entered 
into a private contract with four critical conditions: annual funding, facilities access, organizational 
independence, and continuous longevity.  In exchange, the citizen group would provide numerous 
services that would improve the risk management. These services included environmental monitoring, 
independent research, regional contingency planning advice, environmental protection, and public 
communication regarding Alyeska activities and capabilities (Ginsburg et al. 1993). 
The inclusion of citizen oversight in OPA 90 was advocated and designed by many of the same leaders 
that negotiated the contract between the Alyeska Pipeline Company and the Alyeska Citizen’s Advisory 
Council (Ginsburg et al. 1993).  Therefore, the Alyeska Citizen’s Advisory Committee already fulfilled the 
requirements outlined by OPA 90.  In 1990, the Prince William Sound Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council 
(PWSRCAC) and Cook Inlet Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council (CIRCAC) were legitimized under federal 
law (Ginsburg et al. 1993).  Both groups maintained the four contract agreements (funding, access, 
independence, longevity) originally established with Alyeska Pipeline Company.
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2. Critical Development Factors 
 
In summary, numerous social and political factors contributed to the development of the PWSRCAC.  
The EVOS was one of the most important factors in creating the opportunity for development.  The 
EVOS acted as a focusing event that highlighted the risk governance failures.  With the public trust 
completely deteriorated, there was an opportunity to renegotiate the social contract with government 
institutions and establish an industry-stakeholder partnership. The EVOS altered many of the 
sociopolitical factors described by Lawerence (2002) such as mutual motivation, interdependency, 
recognized legitimacy, and a new dedication to trust building.  When these factors changed, so did the 
impetus for governance changes that incorporated greater public participation. 
The EVOS incident created the opportunity for the PWSRCAC development; however, additional factors 
were also needed to push the concept through to implementation.  First, there was an empirical basis 
from the citizen oversight group already in existence at the Sullom Voe, Scotland.  It served as a model 
that validated the effectiveness of a more participatory risk governance system.  Second, the financial 
resources were available from the oil industry and government grants to fund the organization.  The 
annual costs are relatively low in comparison to the financial burden from an oil spill.   
Other important factors of the PWSRCAC development include strong public leadership, highly 
motivated stakeholders, and policy familiarity.  Public leadership helped organize and sustain public 
pressure for policy change.  Through a series of previous efforts, the public had become experienced 
and knowledgeable advocates for their interest.  Burdened with a disproportionate amount of risks to 
benefits, they were highly motivated to safeguard their economic and social interests.  Despite previous 
failures, the concept for PWSRCAC had become familiar to all main stakeholders in the system.  It is 
likely that the familiarity with the policy alternative prior to EVOS aided its success afterwards. 
B. Design Framework 
 
The design framework analysis starts by describing the PWSRCAC organizational structure and process.  
Afterwards, the guiding evaluation criteria from the literature are used to identify the critical design 
factors that contribute to positive risk outcomes.  However, other important design factors that appear
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 to affect the outcomes will also be identified. All critical factors are also identified in bold italics 
throughout the outcome framework analysis.   
1. Descriptive Analysis 
 
OPA 90 specifically states that the purpose of the Alaskan RCACs is to combat complacency and develop 
trust within the regulatory and oversight process (Ginsburg et al. 1993).  Allowing a self-governing 
citizen group stronger voice into industry and government decisions was seen as a way of safeguarding 
the public interest (Steiner 2007).  The organizational design, both its structure and process, ultimately 
affect its ability to achieve these end goals.  As such, OPA 90 outlines specific design requirements that 
both Regional Citizens’ Advisory Councils must meet, but allows an alternative design if it satisfies the 
intended goals.  The Prince William Sound and Cook Inlet Regional Citizens’ Advisory Councils both 
opted for an alternative design that reflects both OPA 90 requirements and industry contract 
components (PWSRCAC 2009).   
Officially, PWSRCAC is an independent non-profit with a mission of organizing citizens to promote 
environmentally safe operation of the Alyseka Pipeline Service Company terminal in Valdez and oil 
tankers that use it (PWSRCAC 2011).  Its structure and responsibilities stem from the Alyeska contract 
and OPA 90. As such, organizational goals include total compliance with both guiding documents, 
continue to improve environmental safety of oil transportation, develop and maintain excellent external 
and internal communication, and achieve organizational excellence (PWSRCAC 2009).  The driving 
organizational values are volunteerism, providing effective voice for citizens, integrity through truth and 
objectivity, promoting vigilance, and combating complacency (PWSRCAC 2009). 
The contract with the Alyeska Pipeline Company has four important requirements that are important to 
the PWSRCAC structure and processes.  First, it guarantees annual industry funding that that starts at $2 
million and is adjusted annually for inflation.  Second, it provides access to all oil terminal facilities for 
routine inspections of the contingency response equipment.  Third, it ensures absolute independence 
from the oil industry; thereby safeguarding the public interest.  The fourth contract component certified 
that the agreement between the two organizations was valid as long as oil was transported within the 
region. 
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PWSRCAC has an entirely advisory role; none of their recommendations are legally binding.  However, 
the group has been able to leverage its financial resources, human capital, and collaborative capacity to 
achieve successful implementation of many recommendations (Busenberg 2000). In addition, the 
PWSRCAC performs numerous activities that support ongoing recommendations.  Some of these 
activities include, but are not limited to:  (1) monitoring environmental health and industry facilities, (2) 
performing independent research, (3) reviewing policies, permits, and contingency plans, (4) advising 
new or reformed policies and contingency plans, and (5) communicating with the rest of the public 
(Ginsburg et al. 1993).    
As mentioned, PWSRCAC relies on funding, quality personnel, and external partnerships to achieve its 
mission and conduct its necessary activities. In 2011, the budget totaled $3.7 million, with $3.2 million 
funded from the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company and the rest from government grants (PWSRCAC 
2011). Sufficient funding allows the organization to independently gather pertinent and credible 
information from which to base recommendations.  Knowledgeable people within the organization are 
also an important resource because it leads to higher quality recommendations, project initiatives, and 
external credibility (PWSRCAC 2009).  In addition, partnerships with the public, industry, and 
government are vital to obtaining broad support for recommendations and alleviating the financial 
burden of large projects (Busenberg 2000, 1999b).  
The organizational structure for both RCACs is a composite of voting stakeholders, non-voting 
government representatives, and industry funding (PWSRCAC 2011).  The internal personnel consist of a 
board of directors, permanent staff, and committee groups. The PWSRCAC Board of Directors are 
appointed by specifically designated member organizations with representation from interests most at 
risk from marine oil terminal and tanker activities.  Appropriated interests include commercial fishery, 
aquaculture, conservation, recreation, tourism, indigenous groups, and regional cities.  Representatives 
are appointed for two-year terms, but are not restricted to any term limit.  Involvement is completely 
voluntary; the PWSRCAC does not financially compensate board members or their organizations.  
Currently, PWSRCAC has 19 board members with one member from each member organization; except 
the City of Valdez which has two seats.  Member organizations include the Kodiak Island Borough, 
Chugach Alaska Corporation, Alaska State Chamber of Commerce, City of Kodiak, Community of 
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Chenega Bay, Cordova District Fisherman United, City of Seward, AK Wilderness Recreation and Tourism 
Association, City of Wittier, Kenai Peninsula Borough, City of Seldovia, Kodiak Village Mayors 
Association, Prince William Sound Aquaculture Corp., City of Valdez, the Oil Spill Region Environmental 
Coalition, Port Graham corporation, Community of Tatitlek, City of Cordova, City of Homer (PWSRCAC 
2011). 
Official board meetings occur three times a year and involve a comprehensive two-day review of project 
proposals, policy recommendations, financial decisions, and multi-interest stakeholder concerns 
(PWSRCAC 2012).  Industry representatives and ex-officio government officials also attend to stay better 
informed about RCAC activities and risk issues.  Board meetings are also a formal opportunities for 
industry to share information about operations and/or issues of concern.  All meetings, including board 
meetings, are open to any public residents interested in gaining more information or making comments.  
To increase accessibility, board meetings are scheduled months in advance and rotate between the 
Valdez and Anchorage offices.  All meetings are posted online with a toll free number that allows 
teleconference access to any interested individual or group unable to attend.  The structure and process 
allows regular communication exchange among the public, industry, and government agencies.  
The board of directors are further divided into four subcommittees, each responsible for specific 
organizational functions (PWSRCAC 2012).  The Executive Subcommittee meets bi-weekly by 
teleconference and has decision-making authority in between official board meetings.  The Board 
Governance Subcommittee is responsible for PWSRCAC by-laws and policies.  The Legislative 
Subcommittee monitors developments in the state legislature, makes recommendations, and 
communicates with legislatures as directed by the BOD.  The Finance Subcommittee directs all the 
ongoing financial decisions by meeting with independent auditors and staff members.  The internal 
structure established by the subcommittees delegate focused attention and accountability of critical 
PWSRCAC activities. 
The PWSRCAC technical committees direct the majority of the research, document review, and policy 
recommendations that are presented to the board (PWSRCAC 2012). Each technical committee 
concentrates on a particular aspect of risk management for which it advises the BOD.  The technical 
committees include Oil Spill Prevention and Response, Port Operations and Vessel Traffic System, 
P a g e  | 37 
 
 
 
Scientific Advisory, Terminal Operations and Environmental Monitoring, and Information and Education.  
Members are public volunteers that are appointed through a formal application process based on 
expertise, interest, and willingness to serve.  Project teams and working groups are formed to lead 
specific activities within each technical committee.   
Project teams are lead by committee members, but often include other staff, board members, 
contractors and public volunteers (PWSRCAC 2012).  The teams meet frequently to assist internal 
project scoping and progress.  They are responsible for RFP review, contractor selection, ongoing project 
review and recommendations.  A technical committee will assign a working group to a project when 
additional input is deemed necessary.  As with all recommendations, they are only advisory and must be 
approved by the appropriate technical committee. 
Working groups are multi-stakeholder project collaborations that can be initiated by PWSRCAC, the oil 
industry, or a government agency.  Previous working groups have been created to develop new projects, 
regulations, and statutes.  All PWSRCAC commitments require board approval before work begins. 
In addition to the many volunteer positions, PWSRCAC has 16 permanent and paid staff members 
responsible for the ongoing activities in the two offices located in Anchorage and Valdez (PWSRCAC 
2012).  The positions include the executive director, executive assistant, director of external affairs, 
outreach coordinator, director of programs, administrative assistant, financial manager, seven project 
managers, and two assistant project managers.  All the staff are hired and required to report to the 
executive director.   
The PWRCAC design has institutionalized numerous internal checks and balances that provide a high 
level of integrity and accountability.  Additionally, there are many external audits that occur annually to 
ensure intended purpose.  An annual independent audit is conducted on all finances.  Additionally, the 
United States Coast Guard is mandated to conduct an annual recertification of the group to confirm 
compliance with OPA 90 requirements (PWSRCAC 2011).
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2. Critical Design Factors 
 
In summary, PWSRCAC influence in the risk governance system is related to its structural and procedural 
design.  The most critical design factors identified include representation, independence, transparency, 
resource accessibility, collaborative capacity, and institutionalization.  Other components are also 
important contributors, but seem to either be nested in these more general criteria or have a less 
significant role. 
Representation is important because it ensures that all interests have an opportunity for equal voice 
and influence (Reed 2008).  Leveraging diverse interests helps formulate a broader systems perspective 
of the risk governance issues and safeguard against unintended consequences.  Independence allows 
PWSRCAC the flexibility to choose risk issues that are of greatest concern to the stakeholders at most 
risk.  The organization is not bound by obligations or contingencies of any other entity or alternative 
interest. Independence promotes an organizational agenda that it reflective and responsive to the public 
interest (PWSRCAC 2011). Transparency is closely related because it ensures that other stakeholders, 
especially the public, have a clear understanding of PWSRCAC actions, motives, and interests (Steiner 
2007).  Maintaining independence and transparency is important to maintain credibility and allow 
appropriate accountability. 
Resource accessibility is also a major contributor of PWSRCAC success.  PWSRCAC has greater access to 
resources than any other citizen advisory council in the research literature (Busenberg 2000).  Financial 
resources enable PWSRCAC to conduct independent research, hire quality staff, and purchase research 
equipment.  Access to industry facilities allows for direct inspections and monitoring.  Political access 
provides insight into legislative activities and additional pressure behind recommendations (Busenberg 
2000). 
Collaborative capacity allows PWSRCAC to leverage recommendation support and project resources 
from other stakeholders in the risk governance system.  Partnerships and iterative interactions with 
other stakeholders can also improve overall communication and the system responsiveness.  Reduced 
stakeholder conflict also protects against project delays and duplications (Busenberg 1999b).
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Institutionalization is another distinguishing and important feature of PWSRCAC process and design.  
Since the citizen advisory group is a permanent institution in the risk governance system, participants 
can benefit from long-term learning and repeated experiences (Reed 2008).  As a result, other important 
components such as early and continuous involvement, interaction, participatory philosophy, 
competence, tailored methods, and integration of local and scientific knowledge may emerge naturally 
or be easier to achieve. 
The critical development and design factors are also identified in bold italics throughout the outcome 
analysis framework.  
C. Risk Context Framework Analysis  
 
The risk context framework analysis is used to identify the conditions that most warrant the 
implementation of elaborate participatory approaches. Nine relevant risk factors from the International 
Risk Governance Council (2010) report, The Emergence of Risks: Contributing Factors are used to 
describe the risk context before the PWSRCAC creation.  Then, the most critical contextual factors and 
underlying themes are identified and discussed.  The risk context criteria are also examined in the 
outcome analysis framework to illustrate how PWSRCAC has changed these contributing risks factors. 
1. Descriptive Analysis 
Scientific Unknowns 
 
Prior to the EVOS, the system had abundant scientific unknowns related to oil spill risks.  The 
overlapping environmental and technological systems both involve complex relationships with a 
multitude of components that contribute to risk. Scientific analysis cannot reduce all the uncertainty in 
such a complex system, but it is an important first step.  The scientific unknowns present in the risk 
governance system before the EVOS resulted from two sources: inaccurate scientific analysis and a lack 
of scientific analysis all together.  As a result, oil spill prevention and response proved to be inadequate 
before the EVOS. 
Grabowski (2000) has created a risk event error chain to illustrate how the technological, environmental, 
and human systems can interact to cause oil spill (Figure 6).  A triggering event can initiate any one of 
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innumerable risk pathways that cascade into an oil spill.  The root causes are usually organizational 
factors while the intermediate are often situational.  However, the system as a whole is incredibly 
complex and often unpredictable.  Prevention requires extensive information about the relationship 
components so that firewalls can be appropriately designed and implemented.  However, prevention is 
only half the challenge. 
Not all oil spills can be prevented.  Minimizing risk requires additional information on processes and 
tools that can enhance response and mitigate consequences (GAO 1989).  Harrald et al. (1990) illustrates 
the complex decision making process and information requirements involved during a response in 
Figure 4.  Optimal decision making requires information about response technology, human capacity, 
and environmental factors that affect the oil spill behavior.  Both prevention and response require 
tremendous information about complex relationships.  Uncertainty is high and often irreducible.       
Actual risk assessments before the EVOS could not be found.  However, some inadequacies are evident 
in the contingency plans used at the time.  The risk governance system had six different contingency 
plans available to direct oil spill preparation and response during the EVOS (The National Response 
Team 1989).   However, most of these plans underestimated the potential oil spill size.  The risk 
assessments underlying the predictions used historical data and the best available technology (Harrald 
et al. 1990).  Therefore, the contingency plans were not designed for worst-case scenarios and were 
inadequate for low probability, high consequence events (National Response Team 1989, Harrald et al. 
1990).   The scientific uncertainty involved came from a lack of system predictability. 
Clean-up technologies were another issue that was associated with high uncertainty.  The low oil 
recovery rates highlighted technological inefficiencies and implementation challenges that had not been 
adequately considered.  Some technologies, such as chemical dispersants and beach washing, were 
implemented without adequate information on effectiveness or potential side effects (Harrald et al. 
1990).  
In general, high scientific uncertainty contributed to risky management decisions before and during the 
EVOS.  It is acknowledged that some uncertainty may not be reducible because of the system 
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complexity. However, the high amount of uncertainty present in the system before the EVOS indicates 
that more resources could have been allocated to greater reduction.     
 
 
Figure 6. Risk Event Error Chain (Grabowski, et al. 2000) 
Loss of Safety Margins 
 
Oil spills occur from tight coupling between factors within the complex technological and environmental 
systems. An oil spill is the culmination of cascading events that occur through a risk pathway. Prevention 
requires firewalls to intercept or buffer the cascading events that lead to an oil spill (Grabowski et al. 
2009). PWS is a particularly vulnerable system because it includes environmental factors not present in 
other oil terminal and tanker networks such as icebergs, multi-directional winds, shallow reefs, and 
often stormy seas (Merrick et al. 2000, Busenberg 1999b).  The added complexities warrant additional 
safeguards to divert disaster. 
The firewalls present before EVOS were inadequate to buffer the many risk pathways present in the 
system. To begin, regulatory deficiencies encouraged noncompliance behavior.  The United States Coast 
Guard (USGS) is responsible for the oversight of ship design and construction, manning of ships, and ship 
movements (The National Response Team 1989).  At the time, the USGS was not allocating enough 
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resources towards quality personnel and regular inspections.  Government monitoring and enforcement 
were inadequate to establish a risk cognizant system.  
The system also lacked proper technological firewalls that could have prevented the EVOS.  The tracking 
system that used radar to assist transportation safely through the PWS had been reduced prior to the 
incident (GAO 1989, Busenberg 2008).  Additionally, the vessels intended to readjust tankers that 
accidentally go outside the shipping lanes were not in position to help the Exxon Valdez.  As such, the 
system was unable to detect or respond to the navigational error that directed the Exxon Valdez into 
Bligh Reef.   
Oil spills are not completely preventable. Therefore, response plans and equipment are important safety 
buffers that need to be established in vulnerable systems.    EVOS illustrated that the system did not 
have adequate response buffers to mitigate major oil spills.  Contingency plans were not designed for 
worst-case scenarios, response equipment had not been maintained, workers lacked necessary training, 
and the oil spill response team had been disbanded (Busenberg 2008, The National Response Team 
1989). 
Positive Feedback/Communication 
 
The positive feedback between the risk actors and the public was relatively weak prior to the PWSRCAC 
development.  Communication was usually directed one-way from the oil companies to the other 
stakeholders.  Other communicative feedback about system risks was often ignored. The public had 
repeatedly expressed concerns to government agencies that were not addressed in time to prevent the 
EVOS.  One public concern involved the intoxication of oil tanker workers. The public concern came from 
the high prevalence oil tanker workers at local bars.  However, no obvious action was taken to redress 
the public concerns (Alaska Sea Grant 1989).    
In another case, the City of Valdez brought attention to the inadequate local capacity for an oil spill 
response.  The city used an additional tax on the Alyeska property to fund improved planning and 
response equipment. However, the city’s concern for sufficient response equipment was overshadowed 
by a legal battle over the discriminating tax (PWSRCAC 2000). The lawsuit was underway at the time of 
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the EVOS.  In both cases, public feedback highlighted weakness in the risk system without any corrective 
action in response.   
Feedback among government agencies and industry companies was also weak.  For example, after an 
investigation of a prior spill in 1979, the Department of Transportation recommended that PWS increase 
the response equipment available and research new technologies.  However, the recommendations 
were never implemented (Alaska Sea Grant 1989).   
The feedback during the response also increased risk by exacerbating the oil spill severity.  The many 
different stakeholder groups involved in the response lacked clear roles and responsibilities (The 
National Response Team 1989).  Communication problems due to poor radio coverage further 
complicated the issue.  As a result, adversarial relationships developed and reduced the efficiency of the 
clean up (The National Response Team 1989). 
Varying Susceptibilities to Risk 
 
Prior to EVOS, the distribution of benefits and risk was highly disproportional.  Industry acquired 
economic profits with very little risk.  Coastal communities, indigenous populations, and other industries 
that depend on surrounding Alaskan ecosystem acquired only secondary economic benefit, but a large 
proportion of risk.  Moreover, the risk governance system was not structured to channel concerns from 
these groups directly into risk management processes.  On numerous occasions, vulnerable populations 
challenged the current risk governance strategies (PWSRCAC 2000, Busenberg 2011).  However, the 
groups were routinely defeated or ignored (See Feedback for more information). 
 
Conflicts about Interests, Values, and Science 
 
The risk governance system was very contentious prior to the PWSRCAC development.  Conflicts 
between oil development and environmental protection had been ongoing since the large oil reserves 
were found along Alaskan northern coast in 1968 (Busenberg 2011).  First, indigenous groups had to 
compete for land claims that had not been resolved since Alaska obtained statehood.  Then, when the 
Trans-Alaska pipeline was proposed, other environmental groups joined to directly contest the scientific 
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assessments. Collectively, the public stakeholders generated four volumes of counter-arguments, many 
of which relied on scientific critiques by independent experts (Busenberg 2011).   
The contentious balancing of oil development and environmental protection has been an ongoing 
endeavor in Alaska. Even after the Trans-Alaska pipeline and oil terminal were well-established, conflict 
between industry and environment stakeholders persisted.  For example, the City of Valdez and Alyeska 
were involved in an ongoing lawsuit with the State of Alaska during the EVOS (PWSRCAC 2000).  The City 
of Valdez had placed an extra tax on the Alyeska property to fund an environmental service area that 
could better respond to major oil spills.  The money would have been used to purchase extra 
containment booms, skimmers, and other equipment (PWSRCAC 2000).  Eventually, the City of Valdez 
was forced to remove the tax because it was discriminatory treatment of the Alyeska Pipeline Service 
Company.  The decision to overturn the tax followed the EVOS incident and likely contributed to 
growing public distrust. 
The immediate conflict between industry and RCACs in the years following the EVOS also illustrates the 
distrust embedded in the system prior to the new institutional structure.  It is used here, in the risk 
context analysis, to represent the conflicts that would have likely occurred given a more structured 
opportunity. A GAO evaluation (1993) of the AK RCACs indicated that industry and government agencies 
often contested RCAC risk assessments for either being unnecessary duplicates of previous studies or 
flawed due to inappropriate modeling choice and unqualified consultants (GAO 1993).   
Distrust was also provoked by adversarial information sharing between industry and the RCACs. The 
RCACs often released contentious information to the public, including the media, without industry 
notification or consultation (GAO 1993). Meanwhile, industry was unwilling to provide all available data 
requested by the RCACs.  Only after years of repeated interactions did the stakeholders start moving 
towards greater collaboration and mutual understanding (Merrick et al. 2000).  The initial interactions 
explicitly illustrate the conflict and distrust within the system prior to the RCAC development.   
Social Dynamics 
 
There is acknowledged uncertainty regarding the social dynamics within the risk governance system 
prior to EVOS.  However, the oil industries had historically relied on image manipulation, industry-
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sponsored research, and economic considerations to maintain public support (Kurtz 2004).  Public 
relations framed oil spill incidents as random anomalies that could not have been avoided.  Industry 
assumed that it could alleviate public fears by assuring that voluntary actions were taken to prevent a 
duplicate incident.  The public did not have easy access to information that proved it one way or 
another.  Public interest groups were often unable to disprove the industry produced information. 
Additionally, the social dynamics specific to PWS region had a contentious history that often flared up 
between industry and environmental interests (Busenberg 2011). Numerous groups had repeatedly 
come together to fight the expansion of oil development throughout the years (Busenberg 2011, 
PWSRCAC 2000).   
The social dynamics intensified dramatically just after the EVOS. The USCG established a news office 
after the EVOS, but it was overwhelmed by the outpouring of public interest for the event (The National 
Response Team 1989).  Additional public affairs staff needed to be called in to assist ongoing public 
response and outreach.  The large media influx made it even more difficult to aggressively communicate 
with the public.  Phone lines were often jammed and misinformation was hard to control.   After the 
response ended, the public appeared in record numbers to the Exxon Valdez public hearings and 
protesters cut up gas cards at the Exxon corporate offices (Kurtz 2004).  Overall, the social dynamics 
were antagonistic.   
Technological Advances 
 
Technological risk is the main component of the risk governance system.  Prior to the EVOS, industry had 
little incentive to increase flexibility, innovation, or urgency surrounding technological risks.  Oil terminal 
activities and tanker transportation were familiar operations and no major spill had occurred in PWS 
since operations began.  Industry focused on maintaining the status quo with research studies and 
media campaigns that assured system safety (Kurtz 2004).  Other stakeholders had also become lulled 
into a false security that operations utilized the appropriate amount of risk precaution.  There was minor 
pushback from some public voices that the system needed to increase safeguards, but no obvious action 
was taken.  No evidence was found describing any incentives driving increased flexibility and innovation.
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 Temporal Conditions 
  
The regulatory deficiencies that contributed to the EVOS occurred because of a gradual decrease in 
system vigilance.  As time went by without a major spill, risk governance stakeholders began reallocating 
internal resources to other activities.  The oil industry began making statements about the lack of 
danger from spills and cut its entire fulltime pollution response staff (Harrald et al. 1990, Alaska Sea 
Grant 1989).   During a time of budget cuts, the USCG also reduced its pollution response experts.  It 
started using only one observer for the Vessel Transportation System (VTS) and delegated the vessel 
inspections to the American Bureau of Shipping (Harrald et al. 1990).   
The gradual reduction in safeguards made it more difficult to detect risks and respond to oil spill events.  
Decreasing safety personnel and technology safeguards literally reduced the risk sensors in the system.  
Moreover, it indicates a cultural shift in the system perception of risk.   Response was likely to lack the 
necessary urgency because the potential severity of the event is underestimated.   
Information Asymmetries 
 
Prior to the EVOS, the oil industry and government agencies operated in isolation from the public realm 
(Steiner 2007).  Information asymmetries were large since industry generated most of the information 
that was available to other stakeholders (Kurtz 2004).  The public did not have the resources to validate 
information and risk claims.  Instead, the public had to trust that the government agencies (USGS and 
ADEC) were upholding the public interest.  However, a lack of resources and close professional 
relationships with industry made it difficult for government agencies to do so (Alaska Sea Grant 1989).  
Without transparent and accurate information, the public was unable to hold government agencies 
accountable to public interests.  As a result, technological risk was not adequately managed. 
2. Critical Risk Context Factors 
 
Prior to the EVOS all nine of the IRGC risk factors analyzed in this paper were amplifying the risk of oil 
spills in PWS.  High scientific uncertainty, limited risk firewalls, stakeholder conflict, and time induced 
complacency were complex challenges that the governance institutions were unable to manage 
adequately.   However, the distinguishing feature of the risk context is not necessarily any one particular 
risk factor, but the high degree of interaction among them.
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The risk factors are highly interconnected and ambiguously correlated.  This phenomenon is likely 
reflective of the tight coupling among the complex technological, environmental, and social systems.  
These complex relationships require extensive effort to reduce uncertainty.  However, residual 
uncertainty will often remain because of irreducible complexity and inherent unpredictability. Adequate 
risk management requires buffering residual uncertainty.   
The characteristics of the risk context that made PWSRCAC an appropriate policy stem from the multiple 
overlapping and tightly coupled systems (technology, environment, human).  First, high complexity of 
these systems and their interactions led to high uncertainty, often difficult or impossible to reduce. 
Second, there were limited risk firewalls to buffer system risk and uncertainty.  Third, the risk of an oil 
spill is a low probability, high consequence event that is both difficult to predict and maintain ongoing 
vigilance. Fourth, stakeholder value conflicts between tightly coupled industry and environmental 
systems were persistent.  Other factors that merit mentioning include the limited communication 
feedback and rising public distrust.  These risk context conditions warranted a more integrated risk 
governance system that leveraged greater public participation. 
D. Outcomes: IRGC Risk Factor Analysis 
 
The outcome framework analysis is used to describe how the risk context has changed since PWSRCAC 
has been established in the risk governance system. First, the nine relevant risk factors from the 
International Risk Governance Council (2010) report, The Emergence of Risks: Contributing Factors are 
reexamined.  The change in each risk factor that is attributed to PWSRCAC is described.  It is 
acknowledged that the contributions from the PWSRCAC cannot always be isolated.  The critical 
development and design factors that affect the outcomes are identified in bold italics throughout the 
analysis.  Following the IRGC risk factor analysis, the most outcomes are identified and discussed.   
1. Descriptive Analysis 
Scientific Unknowns 
 
Scientific research is a major activity pursued by PWSRCAC.  Since it was established, the PWSRCAC has 
initiated numerous projects that have decreased scientific uncertainties within the risk governance 
system.  To date, the PWSRCAC has 36 projects related environmental monitoring, oil spill prevention, 
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oil spill response, terminal operations, maritime operations, and non-indigenous species (Figure 7; 
PWSRCAC 2012).  These projects explore scientific unknowns related to maritime oil pollution hazards 
and many have influenced decisions by industry and Alaskan state agencies to adopt new risk 
management policies.  PWSRCAC often works in collaboration with industry and government agencies to 
conduct many of these projects.  However, PWS RCAC is often responsible for channeling attention to 
scientific unknowns that need more attention.  
OPA 90 mandates PWSRCAC to conduct long-term monitoring of environmental conditions in the EVOS 
region that could be used in baseline assessments (Busenberg 2007).  Without baseline information, it is 
difficult to accurately determine oil spill damages.  However, PWSRCAC has taken action beyond the 
OPA 90 mandate by partnering with the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council (EVOSTC) to conduct 
larger scale research pertaining to the broader Gulf of Alaska ecosystem (Busenberg 2007). 
Most of PWSRCAC research directly focuses on oil spill prevention and response.  For numerous 
projects, PWSRCAC has initiated research related to scientific uncertainties widely acknowledged, but 
consistently ignored by other risk governance stakeholders.  For example, industry and government 
officials recognized environmental risks related to weather and icebergs, but neither proposed better 
detection equipment (Busenberg 2008).  It was PWSRCAC that initiated research to better understand 
these risks, which eventually lead to important management changes (Busenberg 2008, 1999a).   
In addition to assessing known uncertainties, PWSRCAC conducts projects to evaluate potential risks not 
previously considered.  The risk assessments support ongoing research projects and policy proposals.  
Notable examples include risk assessments on tug escorts, wind conditions, and marine fire training that 
led to risk management improvements (Busenberg 2008, Busenberg 1999a).  PWSRCAC has also 
contributed to a greater understanding of the human factors that contribute to technological risk.  In 
2006, PWSRCAC released a risk assessment that recommended integrating human factor analysis into 
future oil spill risk assessments (Nuka Research and Planning Group, LLC 2006).      
The culmination of PWSRCAC projects has significantly reduced the scientific uncertainty within the risk 
governance system.  The organization has increased the number of risk assessments conducted on the 
system.  Additionally, it has increased the amount information available regarding risk mitigation
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 strategies and technology.  These activities have been widely document in the literature and are made 
transparent through numerous public relation efforts.  In summary, the PWSRCAC has significantly 
reduced scientific uncertainty by conducting long-term monitoring, initiating research, acknowledging a 
broader view of risk assessment, and creating transparency. 
Program Projects 
Oil Spill Response 
Fishing Vessel Training, Incident Response Plan, Oil Spill 
Response Gap, Preparedness Monitoring, 
Telecommunications in PWS, Tethered Balloon Oil Spill 
Surveillance System 
Oil Spill Prevention 
Coastal Management, Community-based Response, 
Contingency Plan Reviews, Coping with Technological 
Disasters, Geographic Response Strategies, Shore Zone 
Mapping, Weather Data 
Terminal Operations 
Ballast Water Treatment Facility, Corrosion Abatement, 
Dismantling/Removal/Restoration Fund, Fire Protection 
Systems, Microbial Efficiency, Non-dispersing Oil Spill 
Response Technologies, National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System Permit, Reconfiguration of Valdez 
Marine Terminal, State of the Environment, Valdez Air 
Quality 
Maritime Operations 
Ice Detection, Marine Firefighting, Place of Refuge, 
Tanker Escort System 
Environmental 
Monitoring 
Biodegradation of Dispersed Crude Oil in the Prince 
William Sound Region, Copepod Testing, Dispersants, In-
situ Burning, Long-term Environmental Monitoring, 
Sediment Coring, Science Night 
Non-Indigenous 
Species 
Non-Indigenous Species & Ballast Water, Non-Indigenous 
Species Bibliographic Database 
Figure 7. PWSRCAC Programs and Projects (PWSRCAC 2012). 
Loss of Safety Margins 
 
PWSRCAC increases safety margins both as a risk management strategy itself and a creator of new risk 
management strategies.  As a risk management strategy itself, PWSRCAC ensures ongoing risk vigilance 
within the system (Busenberg 1999a).  Since other risk governance stakeholders have broader 
responsibilities and interests, they are not always capable of allocating the appropriate resources and 
attention to the cause. Since PWSRCAC focuses all of its resources on oil spill risk reduction it ensures 
safety margins are maintained.  To do so, PWSRCAC monitors industry operations and legislative 
activities to ensure allocated risk resources are not reduced.  
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As a creator of risk management strategies, PWSRCAC has helped increase system safety margins. With 
its narrow risk focus and communication among stakeholders groups, PWSRCAC has been able to 
identify risks and initiate research and policies to establish necessary firewalls (Busenberg 2008).  
Preliminary research from PWSRCAC spurred collaborative action that eventually lead to a network of 
buoyed weather sensors, a responsive tug escort system, and an advanced ice detection system 
(Busenberg 2008).   
The improved weather reporting system was directly proposed by PWSRCAC in 1993.   The proposal was 
immediately supported by industry and government agencies alike (Busenberg 1999a).  They 
acknowledged that weather unknowns enabled tankers to leave the Valdez terminal under dangerous 
conditions.  Improved weather information about ocean conditions beyond the terminal could keep 
tankers out of risky situations.  This widely supported management firewall was only possible because 
PWSRCAC initiated a proposal that could be discussed more broadly. 
In another case, a PWSRCAC survey triggered a series of collaborative actions that lead to another 
firewall in marine ice detection.  A PWSRCAC survey given to tanker officers indicated that traditional ice 
monitoring that used periodic vessel reports and satellite imagery was insufficient (Busenberg 2008).  
The perceived risk from icebergs entering shipping lanes was significant enough to initiate a research 
collaborative that monitored icebergs from the Columbia Glacier.  PWSRCAC was an ongoing partner 
through the initial research, strategy development, and final deployment of a highly advanced ice 
detection system.  The new ice detection system acts as a collision firewall by increasing navigation 
safety through the PWS (Busenberg 2008, 1999a).  PWSRCAC was the first organization to propose 
additional research and improvements. 
PWSRCAC has also been highly involved in tug escort firewalls that are used to keep tankers in the 
designated shipping lanes through the PWS (Merrick et al. 2000).  After advocating for more 
maneuverable tractor tug escorts and an ocean rescue tug, PWSRCAC partnered with industry to do a 
comprehensive risk assessment.  Industry implemented the ocean rescue tug in accordance with the risk 
assessment results.  The AK state government required implementation of the tractor tug escorts even 
though their effectiveness was inconclusive in the risk assessment. The escort tug firewalls would not 
have been possible without the incessant advocacy by PWSRCAC.   
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Regulatory changes after the EVOS mandated other firewalls that the system was previous lacking.  
Some of these mandates include double hull tankers, alcohol testing, marine fire training, an updated 
vessel tracking system, and greater supply of response equipment.  PWSRCAC cannot take credit for any 
of these other important firewalls per se.  However, PWSRCAC has had an important role in monitoring 
implementation. In summary, PWSRCAC contributions in the risk governance systems have significantly 
improved the safety margins by leveraging its resources, dedicated risk jurisdiction, and collaborative 
capacity. 
Positive Feedback/Communication 
 
PWSRCAC increases positive feedback in the system by forcing greater transparency and creating 
dialogue among traditionally disparate stakeholders.  Meetings provide open public forums where 
PWSRCAC members, interested public, industry representatives, and government officials can exchange 
updates, concerns, and proposals related to the risk system.  A GAO report (1993) concluded that that 
the AK RCACs “substantially increased the level of citizen’ involvement with the oil industry and with 
government regulators in environmental oversight of oil terminal and tanker operations”. 
PWSRCAC further closes the gap between the risk governance institutions and the public by increasing 
awareness.  The public outreach program keeps the public abreast on industry operations and 
legislative proposals that could amplify or attenuate risk.  Simultaneously, concerned public have an 
organization specifically established take ongoing citizen oncerns and channel them to decision makers.   
The presence of PWSRCAC has encouraged long-term partnerships among itself, industry, and 
government agencies (PWSRCAC 2011).  The stakeholders do not always agree, but they are regularly 
consulted about current activities and plans.  It increases the system awareness and helps coordinate 
plans and actions that reinforce positive risk management strategies. PWSRCAC significantly increased 
the positive feedback and communication in the system through its ability to build public capacity, 
engage with stakeholders, and adhere to transparent practices. 
Varying Susceptibilities to Risk 
 
PWSRCAC establishes an institutionalized voice for the regional populations most vulnerable to oil spills 
in PWS.  The new liability policies enacted after EVOS increased the industry risk, but did not directly 
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assist vulnerable populations.  PWSRCAC does not directly decrease the risk placed on vulnerable 
populations either, but it gives them an organized method to do it themselves.   Permanent access into 
the risk decision-making process allows representatives to increase their knowledge about the risks and 
the management system.  Consequently, vulnerable populations are better equipped to influence the 
decisions that will affect them.  In essence, it levels the policy playing field.  
In addition to providing greater voice, PWSRCAC has been directly involved in preparing vulnerable 
populations and distributing coping tools to mitigate social impacts.  For example, PWSRCAC initiated a 
marine fire training program to improve oil spill response and decrease risk of worker injury.  The fire 
training was a recognized need in the system, but continuously “ignored because it fell in between the 
jurisdictional responsibilities”.   By closing this management gap, PWSRCAC has made fire fighters less 
vulnerable in oil spill response.  
PWSRCAC has also been responsive to the expansive array of social effects that can stem from 
technological disasters.  It created a “Coping with Technological Disaster” guidebook and DVD for 
communities seeking strategies to better handle social disruptions and psychological stress.  All of these 
examples illustrate how PWCRCA has created opportunities for vulnerable populations to help 
themselves reduce potential and/or inflicted risked.  In general, PWSRCAC somewhat improved the 
varying susceptibilities to risk.  Its contribution does not actually redistribute the risks and benefits, but 
it does empower vulnerable populations by increasing their education, voice, and training. 
Conflicts about Interests, Values, and Science 
 
The PWSRCAC has significantly decreased the conflict around interests, values, and science.  In doing so, 
it has improved risk assessment process, including the problem definition, assumption choices, and 
result interpretation.  High conflict can deteriorate trust among stakeholders, but more collaborative 
risk assessment is expected to rebuild it (Busenberg 1999b).  Since the EVOS and creation of the 
PWSRCAC, the risk governance system has evolved towards a more consensus approach and away from 
the traditional adversarial approach (Busenberg 1999b).  However, the transition has included a learning 
curve among participants.  Repeated long-term interactions likely increased the opportunity to 
decrease conflict and rebuild trust. Conflicts around terminal air emissions and tractor tug vessels 
illustrate the collaborative transition.
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A terminal air emissions conflict started when the oil industry refused to give PWSRCAC the air quality 
data it requested to conduct an independent study (GAO 1993).  An industry risk assessment had 
already evaluated airborne benzene in the City of Valdez.  When the PWSRCAC airborne study was 
completed in 1992, the stakeholder conflict intensified because the results completely contradicted the 
previous industry assessment.  The PWSRCAC concluded that 90% of the benzene originated from the oil 
terminal and proposed the installation of vapor emission controls (Busenberg 2000, 1999b).  However, 
the industry study concluded that it was only responsible for 25% of the airborne benzene and therefore 
refused to install emission controls (Busenberg 2000, 1999b).   
The scientific validity of both studies was questioned as opposing sides assumed intentional 
manipulation (Busenberg 1999b).  In 1993, industry and PWSRCAC finally decided to partner another 
study to break the deadlock and restore credibility.  However, the collaboration was interrupted when 
the U.S. EPA established federal regulations for oil terminal emissions.  To comply with the Clean Air Act, 
the Valdez terminal had to reduce 95% of all hazardous emissions (Busenberg 2000, 1999b).   
Regardless, the air emissions conflict illustrates how stakeholders began shifting towards a more 
collaborative approach to curtail conflict, delay, and distrust. 
Eventually, the PWSRCAC established protocols to discuss project design and review study results with 
industry officials (GAO 1993).  Experience from the air emission conflict and the new communication 
procedures helped alleviate a subsequent conflict that surfaced about tug escort vessels.  In 1994, the 
PWSRCAC proposed replacing current tug escorts vessels with more maneuverable tractor tug vessels 
and adding an ocean rescue vessel to the system (Busenberg 1999a, 1999b, Merrick 2002).  Industry 
opposed the proposal because it viewed the new vessels as unnecessary expenses (Busenberg 1999b).  
Instead of doing independent studies, the stakeholders collaborated in a comprehensive risk assessment 
of marine oil transportation in PWS. 
In 1995, the four main stakeholders (industry, PWSRCAC, ADEC, USGS) formed a steering committee to 
design and adjust the comprehensive risk assessment used to inform the tug escort debate (Merrick 
2002). Initially, industry and PWSRCAC remained skeptical of each other.  They hired separate research 
teams and disagreed over which one should be used use (Busenberg 1999b).  However, they eventually 
combined teams and set additional ground rules for the rest of the process.  The collaborative approach 
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involved educating the steering committee members about scientific language and risk modeling, 
developing a common framework, choosing the alternatives, and discussing assumptions (Merrick 
2002).  All decisions required unanimous consent and all costs be shared (Busenberg 1999b). 
The collaborative approach strengthened the risk assessment in numerous ways.  The broad 
perspectives deepened the problem understanding, increased the available data, and unveiled the 
modeling assumptions (Merrick 2002).  For example, after deciding that the historical data records were 
insufficient, the steering committee leveraged the diverse knowledge from the community to be used in 
the assessment (Merrick 2002, Busenberg 1999b).  Uncertainty and assumptions were explicitly 
addressed by the stakeholders and in the assessment itself.  The final report states, 
“...the reader should recognize that the value of an analysis is not in the precision of the 
results per se, but rather in understanding the system through the identification of 
peaks, patterns, unusual circumstances and trends in the system risk and changes in 
system risk through risk mitigation (Merrick 2002).” 
 
As such, the final risk assessment was co-authored and released by all stakeholders with unified 
acceptance (Busenberg 1999b, Merrick 2002).  In 1997, industry deployed an ocean rescue tug in lieu of 
the results.  The government later mandated tractor tug escorts as the best available technology despite 
inconclusive results in the collaborative risk assessments.  However, the collaborative approach had 
other external benefits including:  pooled resources, mutual learning, and offset suspicion (Busenberg 
1999b).   
Collaborative projects have become an important risk governance strategy since PWSRCAC has become 
more established.  Since 1997, PWSRCAC has collaborated on eight other significant projects directed at 
reducing risk in PWS (Figure 8).  Partners have included a variety of stakeholders from industry, 
government agencies, and universities.  Many of the projects are long-term endeavors that are currently 
active.  Collaboration is particularly important for the large projects because it pools resources into a 
single technical analysis.  In summary, PWSRCAC significantly improved conflict due to its repeated 
interactions, collaborative approach, unanimous consent, cost sharing, and long-term partnerships. 
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Project Dates Partners 
Aquatic Nuisance Species Research 
1997-
present 
USFWS, ADFG, USCG, University of Alaska Fairbanks, oil 
shipping companies, SERVS 
Prince William Sound Risk Assessment 1997-1999 
USCG, ADEC, Alyeska, oil shipping companies, Southwest 
Alaska Pilots’ Association, SERVS 
Remote Ice Detection Radar System 2000-2002 
USCG, NOAA, ADEC, PWS Community College, Oil Spill 
Recovery Institute, U. S. Army, Alaska Tanker Company with 
Captain & Crew of T/V Denali, North Star Terminal & 
Stevedore Company, Southwest Alaska Pilots Association, 
Alaska Foundation Technologies, City of Valdez, Crowley 
Marine Services, National Guard Armory (Valdez), Roosevelt 
Towing, Samson Tug & Barge, TCC, VECO 
Marine Firefighting Symposium 2003 
South West Alaska Pilots Association, USCG, Division of 
Emergency Services, ATC, SeaRiver, Polar Tankers, PWS 
Community College, Bullard, Fire Protection Publications 
Valdez Marine Terminal Contingency Plan 
Coordination Working Group 
1997-
present 
JPO (ADEC, EPA, DOI/BLM), APSC 
Tanker Contingency Plan Coordination 
Working Group 
1997-2006 USCG, RPG (ATC, ConocoPhillips, SeaRiver), 
ARRT Science & Technology Committee 
Dispersant Working Groups 
2003-
present 
USCG, NOAA, BP, ADEC, DOI, NMFS, USFWS, NPS, BIA, 
USFS, ADFG, ADNR, CIRCAC, Alaskan Natives and the oil 
industry. 
Geographic Response Strategies Working 
Groups for Prince William Sound, Cook 
Inlet, and Kodiak 
1997-
present 
USCG, ADEC, ADFG, ADNR, NOAA, NMFS, EPA, DOI, 
USFWS, USFS, USMMS, CIRCAC, oil spill cooperatives, 
shippers and the oil industry. 
Acronyms:  ADEC-Alaska Dept. of Environmental Conservation, ADFG-Alaska Dept. of Fish & Game, ADNR-Alaska Dept. of 
Natural Resources, APSC-Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., ATC-Alaska Tanker Co., BIA-Bureau of Indian Affairs, BLM-Bureau of 
Land Management, BP-British Petroleum, CIRCAC-Cook Inlet Regional Citizens' Advisory Council, DOI-Dept. of the Interior, EPA-
Environmental Protection Agency, JPO-Joint Pipeline Office, NMFS-National Marine Fisheries Service, NOAA-National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Association, NPS-National Park Service, RPG-Response Planning Group, SERVS-Ship Escort Response 
Vessel System, TCC-Tatitlek Chenega Chugach, USCG-U.S. Coast Guard, USFS-U.S. Forest Service, USFWS-U.S. Fish & 
Wildlife Service, USMMS-U.S. Minerals Management Service 
Figure 8. PWSRCAC Collaboration Efforts (PWSRCAC 2012) 
Social Dynamics 
 
PWSRCAC has an active public outreach program that provides information and increases broader 
inclusions on a variety of issues.  The group uses radio announcements, media releases, public reports 
and quarterly newsletters to keep community stakeholders informed about industry activities, 
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legislative action, and ecological condition of PWS.  The outreach program also includes volunteer 
activities and involvement at community events to get the public directly involved in ongoing projects 
(PWSRCAC 2000).  Meanwhile, the PWSRCAC website provides a comprehensive and transparent 
catalogue of all the information released.   The public has a permanent location to find and request 
information.  Should another major oil spill occur in the region, PWSRCAC would likely enhance public 
relations among the response organizations and the public.  To conclude, the PWSRCAC has somewhat 
improved social dynamics by increasing the inclusion and dialogue among stakeholders. 
Technological Advances 
 
The EVOS focused attention on the management weaknesses that could be improved with greater 
flexibility, innovation, and urgency. There were many regulatory changes after the spill that improved 
the management of technological risk.  New mandates included both technological standards (ex. 
double hull tankers) and worker standards (ex. Limitations on worker hours) (PWSRCAC 2009).  Other 
regulatory changes created incentives for continuous management improvements.  Undoubtedly, the 
increases in the liability limit have created a larger incentive for industry to increase risk management as 
a business strategy.  However, the introduction of PWSRCAC into the risk governance system has also 
contributed to greater flexibility, innovation, and urgency. 
PWSRCAC increases the flexibility of the system to better adapt to changing circumstances.  PWSRCS 
has a critical role in monitoring the environmental and social effects related to current and new 
management strategies.  It also has an important role in reporting monitoring results and advocating 
recommendations to the other stakeholders in the system. The process reflects the adaptive 
management strategy, in which strategies are implemented, monitored, and then adjusted based on 
the monitoring results (Linkov, et al. 2006).  The only difference is that the system is institutionalized 
and a citizen group is delegated specific roles in the process. 
Improvements in innovation and urgency are partly addressed by the other risk factors.  For example, 
PWSRCAC has initiated research on many unexplored risks that eventually led to the deployment of 
innovative technology (i.e. network weather sensors, tug escort system, ice detection system; See Safety 
Margins).  Urgency has been improved by increasing the system vigilance throughout time (See 
Temporal Conditions).  In general, the PWSRCAC has improved the flexibility, innovation, and urgency 
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surrounding technological risks by reporting monitoring results, advocating recommendations, initiating 
research, and integrating an adaptive management strategy into the system. 
Temporal Conditions 
  
The main purpose of PWSRCAC was to combat complacency and ensure ongoing risk vigilance in the 
system.  Many of the activities that PWSRCAC pursues are directed towards this end goal.  Specific 
personnel are directed towards monitoring legislative activity and bringing attention to any proposals 
that could reduce risk in the system, including budget decisions (PWSRCAC 2000).   PWSRCAC also 
periodically reviews terminal operations and tanker standards (PWSRCAC 2009).  These third-party 
oversight activities provide an additional layer of accountability and increase the transparency with the 
public. 
Busenberg (1999a) concluded that the new institutional arrangement, defined by the presence of 
PWSRCAC, has effectively protected the system from invading complacency.  Even managers from the 
oil shipping companies have acknowledged that PWSRCAC forces them to reduce complacency 
(Busenberg 1999a).  Despite two decades since the EVOS, the risk vigilance in the system has not 
deteriorated as expected.  Rather than the expected decreases in safeguards, the system has increased 
safety margins as more knowledge is generated.  In general, the PWSRCA has significantly reduced the 
negative impacts related to temporal conditions due to its ongoing risk vigilance, complacency 
deterrence, accountability, and transparency. 
Information Asymmetries 
 
Since the PWSRCAC has become institutionalized into the risk governance system the information 
asymmetries have become more balanced among the stakeholders.  PWSRCAC has the resources to 
generate independent information that is then made easily accessible to the public, industry, and 
government agencies.  Initially, PWSRCAC duplicated some industry risk assessments to validate the 
results (GAO 1993).  At the time, distrust was still high and the stakeholders were still using adversarial 
approaches to interact.  Since then, the benefits of collaboration have emerged and now information is 
more accessible and transparent.  Project collaboration and information sharing among stakeholder 
groups is more common, especially for large and/or potentially controversial projects.
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Since the information asymmetries among stakeholders have decreased, the system is more 
accountable to the public interests.  New scientific risk assessments and other projects need to pass the 
scrutiny of the other stakeholders to uphold credibility. PWSRCAC also gives the public a larger 
opportunity to be more informed and involved.  Newsletters and media releases summarize issues 
without technical jargon. In summary, PWSRCAC has significantly improved the information 
asymmetries by allocating resources, generating independent information, ensuring accountability, and 
encouraging collaboration and information sharing.  
2. Critical Outcome Factors 
 
The outcomes of the PWSRCAC involvement in the risk governance system are evaluated by the change 
the IRGC risk factors (Figure 9).  While there were many policy and institutional changes after the EVOS, 
analysis focused on PWSRCAC contributions as much as possible.  The outcome framework analysis 
illustrates that PWSRCAC reduced risk related to every IRGC risk factors examined (Figure 8).  No 
quantitative or qualitative weight was given directly to mark the degree of change.  
The widespread improvement of the IRGC risk factors indicates that PWSRCAC has increased the 
resiliency of the risk governance system.  While all of the IRGC risk factors improved, some broader 
trends merit specific mentioning.  First, PWSRCAC lowered the known uncertainty by creating its own 
assessments, entering collaborative projects, and strengthening regulatory incentives.  Second, it has 
proposed, supported, and implemented numerous safeguards to interfere with the most vulnerable risk 
pathways in the system and buffer for unknown risks.  Third, PWSRCAC has promoted stronger 
integration among stakeholders to better manage irreducible uncertainty and alleviate value conflicts. 
Adding diverse perspectives has created a broader systems perspective that is necessary to identify 
system weaknesses located on the peripheral.  Increased communication among participants has 
enabled the system to be more responsive to new information or risks.  In combination, the risk 
governance system has become more adaptive and resilient due to the presence of PWSRCAC.
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IRGC Risk Factor Risk Context (Before EVOS) Outcome (After PWSRCAC) Change 
Scientific Unknowns 
Underestimated Risk Predictions, 
Limited Response Information, 
Unknown Technological Impacts 
Improved Contingency Plans, 
Long-term Environmental 
Information, Attention to Human 
Errors, Identification of 
Unrecognized Risks, Abundant 
Scientific Research 
Significant Improvement 
Loss of Safety Margins 
Tight coupling, Inadequate 
Regulation, Limited Technological 
Safeguards, Insufficient 
Response Plans/Equipment 
Abundant Safeguards,  Improved 
Compliance Enforcement, 
Innovative Safeguard 
Technology, System 
Redundancy, Greater 
Stakeholder Coordination 
Significant Improvement 
Positive Feedback & 
Communication 
One-way Communication, Lack 
Response to Public Concerns, 
Conflict Distractions, Ignored 
Safety Recommendations, Lack 
of Response Coordination 
Multi-directional Communication, 
Coordinated Plans and Activities, 
Greater Response to Concerns 
Significant Improvement 
Varying Susceptibilities 
to Risk 
Coastal Communities, Fisherman, 
and Indigenous Populations at 
High Involuntary Risk 
Procedural Fairness,  Attention to 
Local Risk,  Increased Local 
Capacity, Empowerment 
Vulnerable Populations 
Improvement 
Conflicts about 
interests, values, 
science 
Pervasive Conflicts, Contested 
Risk Assessments, Duplicate 
Studies, High Distrust, Limited 
Consultation 
Collaborative risk assessments, 
Increased Stakeholder Trust, 
Mutual Understanding, Unified 
Risk Acceptance, Resource 
Sharing, Unveiled 
Assumptions/Uncertainty 
Significant Improvement 
Social Dynamics 
Adversarial Relationships, Image 
Manipulation, Limited 
Transparency, Limited Public 
Relations for Response, Public 
Protests 
Broader Stakeholder Inclusion, 
Information Sharing, Education 
Programs, Involvement at 
Community Events, Public 
Volunteering, Ongoing Public 
Information Hub 
 Improvement 
Technological Advances Limited Incentive for Safeguards 
Innovative Safeguards, Adaptive 
Management, Greater Research 
Significant Improvement 
Temporal Complications 
Gradual Decrease of Vigilance, 
Promoting No Spills and Safety 
Signal, Regulatory Budget Cuts, 
Safeguard Reductions 
Deterred Complacency, Maintain 
Regulatory Budgets, Regular 
Safety Reviews 
Significant Improvement 
Information 
Asymmetries 
Limited Public Access, Resource 
Discrepancies, Lack 
Transparency 
Greater Public Access, Abundant 
Non-Industry Information, Fact 
Checking, Public Education 
Significant Improvement 
Main Features 
Multiple Interacting Systems, High 
Complexity, Irreducible 
Uncertainty, Enduring Conflict, 
Challenging Temporal Conditions 
Reduced uncertainty, Increased 
firewalls, Improved 
Communication Feedback, 
Alleviated Conflict, Deterred 
Complacency 
Adaptive, Resilient, 
Systems Perspective 
Figure 9. IRGC Risk Factor Analysis Summary and Comparison (Risk Context = Before EVOS, Outcomes =After PWSRCAC) 
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IV. Conclusions 
The retrospective multi-framework analysis identifies the critical context, development, and design 
factors that have successfully shifted a risk governance system towards the new risk paradigm (Figure 
10).  The critical development factors that made the risk governance shift feasible for the case study are 
large barriers for other mineral industry systems.   These critical development factors include the EVOS 
focusing event, the empirical basis, financial resources, leadership, public motivation, and policy 
familiarity.  The role of impetus and need for more supportive social capacity are likely to be some of the 
biggest challenges in the transition of other systems. 
 
The design and contextual factors might be more controllable and/or identifiable.  The design 
components that most influenced risk outcomes include representation, independence, transparency, 
resource accessibility, collaborative capacity, and institutionalization.  General contextual conditions 
within the risk system include tight coupling among multiple systems, high complexity, irreducible 
uncertainty, enduring conflict, and challenging temporal conditions. 
 
Framework Guiding Questions Critical Factors 
Risk Context 
When is the RCAC model for risk 
governance necessary or appropriate?  
Under what conditions? 
 Multiple Interacting Systems, High Complexity, 
Irreducible Uncertainty, Low Predictability, 
Enduring Conflict, Challenging Temporal 
Conditions (Infrequent, Lag Time, etc.), Limited 
Communication Feedback, High Public Distrust 
Development 
What social and political factors are 
needed to make the elaborate shift to a 
new risk governance paradigm feasible? 
Impetus (Mutual Motivation, Interdependency, 
Recognized Legitimacy, Dedication to Trust 
Building), Empirical Basis, Financial Resources, 
Public Leadership, Motivated Public, Policy 
Familiarity 
Design 
How should the new public participation 
institutions be designed (process, 
structure, resources)?   
Representation, Independence, Transparency, 
Resource Accessibility, Collaborative Capacity, 
Institutionalization 
Outcomes How has the system risk changed? 
Reduced  Uncertainty, Increased  Firewalls, 
Increased Communication Feedback, Alleviated 
Conflict, Deterred Complacency, Improved 
Adaptive Capacity, Created Broader Systems 
Perspective 
Figure 10. Multi-Framework Analysis Critical Factors Summary 
The intent of the study is not to suggest a prescriptive risk governance structure that will work for all 
complex and uncertain risks.  In fact, the analysis acknowledges that complex risks vary widely and a 
prescriptive mechanism is inappropriate.  Moreover, the PWSRCAC is not a perfect example of risk 
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governance or participatory inclusion.  PWSRCAC is an elaborate participatory institution, but its role is 
limited to advisory.  Financial resources are necessary to generate the supporting evidence that can 
leverage successful implementation of recommendations (Busenberg 2007).  Additionally, PWSRCA and 
other stakeholder groups continue to rely on traditional quantitative risk assessments to inform risk 
management decisions.  The tug escort collaborative and human risk factor analysis are examples that 
unveil value judgments and broaden assessment criteria, but these are not the norm.   Most PWSRCAC 
recommendations are based on independent risk assessments by external consultants.  Finally, the 
inclusion of PWSRCAC in the risk governance system could increase risk management costs and/or 
delays.  The current analysis does not examine financial or time efficiency. 
 Regardless, the PWSRCAC model should be considered for tailored implementation in other complex 
risk systems that have similar risk management challenges.  The multi-framework analysis illuminates 
critical factors to consider when determining when and how to design a new risk governance system.  
Currently, there are abundant complex risk issues that involve overlapping technological and 
environmental systems. All of these risks systems challenge the traditional risk paradigm and 
surrounding governance institutions to adequate manage risks.  Future research should evaluate the 
potential implementation within other systems.   
There are some systems that have already proposed using the PWSRCAC model to manage such 
challenges.  For instance, expansion of the Alaskan RCACs jurisdiction to include the upstream pipeline 
infrastructure has been repeatedly advocated and considered among stakeholders (AEDC 2010). The 
prospect of such expansion indicates a certain level of perceived success within the region.  If 
implemented, it would provide a more specific model for pipeline risks in other areas.   
The PWSRCAC model has also been proposed in the wake of the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill.  
Communities throughout the region have worked closely with representatives from the Alaskan RCACs 
to leverage past development and design experience (PWSRCAC 2010).  In January 2011, The President’s 
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon released a final report that recommends the 
creation of Regional Citizen Advisory Councils (RCACs) similar to those established by OPA 90 (National 
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling 2011).  However, at this time, 
there has not been a legislative mandate for a RCAC that would permanently work with industry and 
regulators on enduring risk management activities. 
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Other technological risk systems, particularly those experiencing rapid innovation, should also consider 
the implications of the PWSRCAC case study.  Steiner (2011) has advocated using the Alaskan RCAC 
model for mines across the Pacific.  However, there is no reason that they should not be considered in 
other areas as well. For example, one pertinent state issue involves copper mining development in 
northeastern Minnesota.  Innovative technology has opened new economically feasible reserves of low 
grade copper ore in an ecologically sensitive region of the state.  The project proposes safeguards to 
prevent environmental contamination, but the safeguards have never been tested in the region’s water-
rich system (MPR 2012).   
Another prevalent issue nationally involves the use of hydraulic fracturing to extract oil and gas from 
shale formations.  The process injects undisclosed chemicals mixed with sand and water underground to 
cause shale fissures that release oil and/or gas. There are rising concerns related to aquifer 
contamination, wastewater disposal, and earthquakes (Rozell and Reaven 2011).  However, science and 
value conflicts among stakeholders continue to delay policy decisions (New York Times 2012). 
Oil transportation, copper mining, and natural gas extraction all have unique risks that vary widely in the 
contextual details.  However, they all share broad commonalities related to risk governance challenges.  
Each scenario described involves complex relationships, uncertain consequences, and adversarial 
stakeholders.  These contextual components suggest that risk governance could improve management 
outcomes by shifting towards the new risk paradigm that incorporates greater public participation.  
Despite the growing number of complex technological and environmental risks, numerous barriers 
continue to restrict widespread adoption of a more participatory risk governance approach.  The 
PWSRCAC case study indicated that institutionalize public participation is a critical design factor that 
contributes to positive risk outcomes. However, new participation institutions will require exigent 
institutional changes.  Moreover, the case study supports the notion that other supporting sociopolitical 
factors that are necessary for successful implementation.  A focusing might be necessary, but does not 
appear to be sufficient alone.  These results are consistent with previous research examining the role of 
focusing events and governance change (Kurtz 2004). 
Without a crisis to create the impetus, stakeholders may lack the necessary incentives to voluntarily 
move towards a new governance system.  The public may lack leadership and motivation to champion 
new institutions specifically designed for them. Political will may be limited by jurisdiction complications 
in the region.  Multi-state jurisdiction over technological or environmental risks makes coordination 
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even more complicated because of the inherent mixed motivations and resource asymmetries (Hassler 
2011).   
It is interesting that many of the oil companies in the PWS risk governance system are also involved in 
other technological and environmental risks around the nation.  While PWSRCAC appears to have the oil 
industry support, these oil companies are not embracing other elaborate public partnerships.  One 
reason could be that PWS has specific environmental hazards, such as icebergs, that highlight the 
inherent vulnerabilities in the system. Industry may not perceive or acknowledge the vulnerabilities in 
other risk systems that may warrant broader involvement. Also, industry experience in the PWS risk 
governance system may link public partnerships with lower economic efficiency.  The current case study 
does not attempt an analysis to determine whether industry has achieved optimal economic risk.  
Future studies should examine financial costs and time delays within the PWSRCAC risk governance 
system.  Comparing different regional motivations that impede and encourage development of the new 
risk paradigm would also be valuable research for future studies. 
Another barrier that restricts greater integration of the public is a lack of clear evidence regarding the 
potential benefits and appropriate design. This multi-framework analysis is an example how research is 
moving towards a more interdisciplinary and systems approach.  However, additional work is greatly 
needed to address the new questions raised and overcome current analysis limitations.  The 
acknowledged limitations of this study are described below. 
There are several assumptions used in the retrospective multi-framework analysis conducted in this 
study. First, the case study was chosen to exemplify a successful risk governance structure that 
leverages broader perspectives in the decision-making processes.  Ideally, success would be defined as 
less oil spill frequency and severity of impacts.  However, major oil spills are low probability events that 
are difficult to predict and illustrate in trends, especially over a short time period.  Since non-events 
cannot be analyzed, it is impossible to determine if the PWSRCAC presence has directly prevented oil 
spill incidents or severity of effects.  However, the outcome analysis illustrates how the factors that 
often contribute to overall risk have been reduced since the PWSRCAC creation. 
Second, PWSRCAC was one of numerous policy and institutional changes that took place after the EVOS. 
Undoubtedly, these other policies have contributed to significant risk reductions in the risk governance 
system as well.  The analysis does not intend to credit PWSRCAC for all the improvements that have 
taken place since EVOS.  In fact, the outcome framework analysis focuses on the direct contributions of 
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PWSRCAC as much as possible.  However, most outcomes have multiple driving forces that could not be 
separated.  PWSRCAC is often a major driver, but not always the only one.   
As has been acknowledged throughout this paper, there are contextual limitations that impede the 
transfer of analysis implications to other risk systems. In addition to the specific contextual differences 
between risks systems, unknown conditional thresholds limit the transferability of current implications. 
Many risk systems have acknowledged complexity, uncertainty, and adversarial social dynamics.  
However, the current analysis does not clarify the critical thresholds is for high complexity, uncertainty, 
and/or conflict that warrant greater public inclusion in risk governance.  It is possible that all of these 
risk systems could benefit from new forms of public participation.  The problem remains the 
complicated alignment of the contextual conditions, developmental capacity, and functional design. 
Complex and uncertain risks continue to be pervasive throughout modern society.  These risks demand 
new decision making processes and management models that can procure the benefits of technological 
opportunities without inflicting unnecessary environmental and social harm.  Values and uncertainty 
need to be unveiled and systematically integrated with science to inform policy decisions.   While, 
science is absolutely necessary, it is insufficient on its own.   
The PWSRCAC case study presented in this paper shows how the risk governance system can shift 
towards the new risk paradigm that integrates science and values.  It further illustrates how broader 
public participation in risk governance can lower risk and increase system resiliency.  The new risk 
governance system has successfully reduced uncertainty, increased firewalls, improved communication 
feedback, alleviated conflict, and deterred complacency.  This case study demonstrates the potential 
benefits of the new risk paradigm and the critical factors that should be considered for transferred 
success.   
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